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This thesis studies biases in offshoring decisions and proposes a tool to improve understanding 
of the value of lead-time. Recent research results show local responsive production reduces 
mismatch between supply and demand, but this aspect of the cost is often overlooked in 
offshoring decisions, leading to suboptimal decisions. The tradeoff between lower unit costs 
and mismatch cost under demand uncertainty as lead-time increases, and the benefits of a local 
portfolio of products with different demand volatility, make the offshoring decision complex 
and the optimal solution sometimes counterintuitive. Building on behavioral research, I 
designed software-based laboratory trials to explore patterns of decisions in an offshoring 
problem, and a simulation-game to help teach and communicate research insights. In the first 
paper, I find that participants facing an offshoring problem fail to apply the economically 
optimal strategy. In the second paper, I find that non-economic factors like peer influence play 
a role in offshoring decisions. These trials are exploratory in nature and do not provide 
generalizable results, rather, they are a step towards a better understanding of the fundamental 
research questions and the conception of experiments. In the third paper, I describe the 
development and use of a simulation-game to help students, managers and policy makers 
understand the value of lead-time and volatility portfolio through an active learning approach. 
My work contributes to the understanding of the impact of bounded rationality in offshoring 
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Recent research results show that local production in high-cost countries can be competitive. 
Manufacturing of many products that have been offshored over the last decades can and should 
be made locally, where the products are sold, and not on the other side of the globe. 
When taking mismatch costs into account, and with an appropriate product portfolio 
strategy, there is no need to spread the supply-chains always thinner and to weaken them in the 
process. Instead, the reactivity of local production offers opportunities in terms of demand 
fulfillment and product development, as well as important positive social externalities.  
In a world where offshoring of most manufactured products has become the norm, these 
research results are counterintuitive. Moreover, they rely on statistical tools that are not trivial. 
At the University of Lausanne, we decided to teach these insights upfront in an 
introduction course to Operations Management. Over a semester of two hours of weekly 
classes, we adopt a flipped classroom approach, weekly testing and the use of custom tools and 
simulation-games to provide students with a toolbox for supply-chain analysis and discussions 
that foster a deep understanding of local responsive manufacturing. 
Once students master the tools and digest the concepts, they often come back with a simple 
but cornerstone question: Why? 
Why do decision-makers keep offshoring their production tools and their knowledge, to 
countries 10,000 kilometers away? Why complicate the supply-chain to the point that any glitch 
will disrupt it? Why exploit underpaid workers, occasionally children, when it would be 
possible to offer jobs to local workforce? Why have garments travel the world in containers 
with a terrible carbon footprint to save 20% on unit costs, when twice as much is lost in demand 
mismatch as a result of the lead-time increase caused by this very transportation?  
The answer to these fundamental questions is the basis of understanding managers who 
pursue a policy that is not only not optimal, but harmful. Even a solid idea will not have a real-
world impact if it is filtered out by decision-makers, or seen as interesting but not applied. 
The key, in my opinion, is the integration of decision-making into economic theory. 
Economics is not the science of money as the general public often assumes, but the science of 
human choices and preferences. 
The common misconception that managers are rational-decision machines must be 




incentivize and teach management. Results show local manufacturing competitiveness relies on 
an analysis of demand volatility on one side, and costs on the other — but, in the real world, it 
is difficult to get a solid grip on these two factors. Theories assume a thorough demand analysis 
and set parameters. But managers cannot rely on such assumptions. On a daily basis, they deal 
with messy, and more or less outdated, irrelevant or missing data, oversimplified – when any – 
demand analysis and a dozen reasons “the model cannot be applied here.” Managers are in an 
ecosystem of uncertainty, urgency and pressure, each with its own business-specific or 
company-specific culture and ways of doing things. Of course, each system also has its own 
performance indicators.  
Only when these factors are taken into consideration can we begin to understand why an 
easy anchor like the unit cost of a product is a go-to decision criterion, while hidden costs like 
supply and demand mismatch are neglected. Poor decisions are easier to justify when 
management craves simple indicators and an illusion of rationality amid uncertainty. It is 
natural, as well, to follow trends set by big name companies. When all the competitors are 
offshoring, it seems safe to assume they know something, they know better, and someone has 
found the holy grail of perfect data and did the calculations. Right?  
All these factors encourage myopic strategies, that step by step, one local optimization 
after the other, have made an overcomplicated system, overextended to the point of dislocation, 
look like an optimal solution, when it is, in fact, generating weaknesses, costs and risks. These 
cost-minimizing strategies are based on models that artificially reduce uncertainties to risks, 
and usually reduce risks to convenient normal distributions. Unsurprisingly, their outputs look 
good on paper but offer no robustness to real-life challenges. The goal is to train students, future 
managers, to avoid these pitfalls, deal with uncertainty and have a positive impact on companies 
and society. 
In this thesis, I explore the offshoring decisions through the lens of behavioral science. 
Based on the literature on heuristics and biases, I designed laboratory trials to highlight the 
dimensions involved in offshoring decisions: do people try to optimize profit? Are they able to 
compute the optimal solution to a problem involving costs and demand volatility? Do such 
affect factors as social externalities and peer influence have an impact on these decisions?  
Also, to facilitate teaching and communication of the research insights on local 
manufacturing competitiveness, I developed a simulation-game that helps students, managers 
and policy makers understand the value of reducing lead-time. 




 The first paper looks at a software-based trial I designed presenting a choice between 
local production, with high costs but known demand, and offshoring, with lower costs but high 
demand uncertainty. Based on previous studies in quantitative finance and the Cost Differential 
Frontier tool developed at University of Lausanne, I created two scenarios challenging 100 
participants to make a profit-optimizing decision. The main research question is: Are 
participants able to formulate a rational solution for a complex problem involving cost of 
uncertainty and volatility? And if not, can we identify biases in their decision-making? The 
results show a misuse of heuristics leading to suboptimal decisions and highlight the potential 
usefulness of decision tools to help decision-makers evaluate the value of responsiveness when 
facing demand uncertainty. 
In the second paper, I describe extending the software-based task to explore the impact 
of non-economic factors, like peer influence – the modification of one's attitudes, values or 
behaviors to follow or conform to those of an influencing group or individual – and framing – 
the modification of the perceived value of alternatives by highlighting different features – on 
decision-making. The laboratory trial is designed as an application of the classic heuristics and 
biases experiments to a specific business case. With 100 new participants in two new 
conditions, and using the results of the previous paper as a baseline, I seek to answer the 
question: Can non-economic factors influence a managerial decision? Results show an impact 
of peer-influence on the decision of participants, while the framing of the offshoring choice as 
a social decision rather than a business decision fails to show a significant effect. 
This experimental work aims at opening a new decision space beyond the classic 
Newsvendor problem. Although a formal theoretical frame is lacking at this stage of the 
research, the trials highlight the existence of behavioral effects that can inform the development 
of teaching and decision-helping tools. 
In the third paper I present the Lead-Time Manager, a simulation-game I developed at 
the University of Lausanne on the topic of lead-time, demand volatility and offshoring decision-
making. I detail the scenario, underlying model, and interface of the simulation-game, as well 
as its integration in an Operations Manager course and the way it helps acquiring complex and 
counter-intuitive notions. Finally, I share some insights from this experience that may inform 
the development of similar game-simulations in a teaching and research communication 
context. The Lead-Time Manager is an answer to the need for decision-helping tools 




I consider my research to be at the intersection of three different fields: lead-time in 
Operations Management, heuristics and biases in Behavioral Economics, and simulation-
game design in Active Learning education approach. 
I examine an Operations problem – offshoring – through the lens of heuristics and 
biases and propose a solution in the form of an Active Learning tool. The literature on the 
value of lead-time was the starting point of my research and is the theme of both my 
laboratory trials and the simulation-game I developed. The literature on heuristics and biases 
shaped my approach to the Operations problem and informed the design of my software-based 
tasks. The literature on Active Learning opened a solution space and informed my 
development of the Lead-Time Manager simulation-game, which is a contribution to this 
field. 
According to Hevner et al. (2004, p. 76), Information Systems is the confluence of 
behavioral science and design science, to “extend the boundaries of human problem solving 
and organizational capabilities by providing intellectual as well as computational tools.” In 
that spirit, my thesis contributes to the understanding of how offshoring decisions are made, 
the limit of the rationality in the process and how we can help managers and future managers 
make better, more informed decisions with the help of such hand-on tools as simulation-
games that make abstract insights more accessible. 
To help contextualize the papers, I start with a literature review on each of these three 













1.2) Valuing Lead-Time 
1.2.1) Decision Lead-Time 
The starting point of my thesis was the research of de Treville on the value of lead-time. The 
base assumption is a classic Operations Management case in which a company selling 
manufactured goods must decide how to produce them. Demand and/or product development 
occur in one location. The company can produce close to its market and/or development center, 
which we define as local production; or it can produce farther away, often at a lower cost. Such 
distant producers are often offshore, so we will refer throughout this thesis to a choice between 
local and offshore production. A local production allows for responsiveness, potentially on-
demand production, but incurs higher costs because of the salary standards of the “high-cost 
countries.” An offshore supplier can provide lower costs per unit, but implies a long decision 
lead-time, defined as the time between commitment to a production/order decision and 
observation of the actual demand. A decision lead-time of zero would mean producing on 
demand, instead, the offshore supplier requires orders to be passed weeks to months before the 
demand is known, which implies a level of uncertainty. 
Back in 2004, de Treville, Shapiro and Hameri (2004) studied the case of a paper 
production company that was struggling with its supply-chain performance, experiencing both 
inventory surplus for some products and shortage of other custom products required by 
increasingly demanding customers. The analysis showed that improving the information flow 
from market to upstream actors, a typical reflex in this situation, fails to solve the problem if 
the lead-time is not reduced. In this first study, the idea of supplier distance was not yet present, 
and the lead-time reduction was achieved by changing production cycles, reducing lot sizes, 
and generally reorganizing the capacity to aim for flexibility. 
The geographical aspect surfaced a few years later (de Treville & Trigeorgis, 2010). The 
authors noted that many supply-chains have become so extended and lean, to profit from the 
lowest possible unit costs, that they have also become extremely fragile. Any unexpected event, 
a change in demand or an issue in the supply-chain, can have catastrophic consequences on the 
whole operation. They presented the possibility of bringing the production close to the market 
as a financial option. Much like an insurance policy, this is a cost to pay in exchange for the 




1.2.2) Cost Differential Frontier 
In 2014, de Treville, Schuerhoff et al. (2014) formalized the idea and developed a model, based 
on real-options theory, that gives a monetary value to lead-time reduction. The inputs of the 
model are basic and refer to the classic Newsvendor model (Arrow, Harris & Marschak, 1951): 
distribution of the demand, price, cost, and salvage value of the product.  
The output of the model is the price premium that the company should rationally be 
willing to pay to reduce or eliminate the decision lead-time, thereby reducing exposure to 
demand volatility. This postponement of the time when the production decision must be made 
is achieved by producing as close as possible to the market. 
Demand uncertainty leads to mismatch costs – storage/disposal of surplus inventory, 
or sales missed because of shortages – and investing in lead-time reduction is a way to 
decrease the mismatch. The model evaluates the point of equilibrium that optimizes profit. 
An online calculator (http://cdf-oplab.unil.ch) is freely available and expresses the 
output either in terms of Cost Differential – how much cheaper unit costs should the offshore 
supplier offer to be interesting despite mismatch – or Cost Premium as shown in figure 1.1  – 
what unit costs increase should a company be willing to incur to reduce its lead-time. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The Cost Premium Frontier calculator developed by de Treville, Schuerhoff et al. (2014) 
expresses in a straightforward way the value of lead time reduction, in terms of a premium that a 




The authors noted that, contrary to common usage, a lognormal distribution is a better 
fit for modeling demand than a normal one as it includes the possibility of big demand peaks. 
Such peaks are critical to consider as they can be both a source of great mismatch between offer 
and demand, or a source of profit if operations are designed for responsiveness to demand surge. 
It also allows for the representation of demand distribution with coefficients of variation larger 
than 0.33 without generating aberrant negative demand on the left side of the distribution. The 
intuition behind the model is that as demand volatility increases, the risk of mismatch between 
production and demand increases, too, giving more value to the option of producing locally.  
In a subsequent study, de Treville, Bicer et al. (2014) applied the model at three 
companies in vastly different industries – a carmaker, a food and beverages company, and a 
pharmaceutical firm – and got feedback from practice, showing  the model is simple enough to 
be usable in a real-life environment. The lack of accurate historical data did not prevent the 
authors from estimating the volatility of demand, as they developed different estimation 
methods that can rely on managers’ knowledge and intuition about demand peaks, intensity and 
frequency. The results showed that the value of lead-time was consistently underestimated in 
companies, mainly because managers overlooked demand volatility, or oversimplified it by 
looking at sales data instead of investigating actual demand. 
Furthermore, the model considers only mismatches arising from demand-volatility 
exposure. The examples presented by de Treville, Bicer et al. (2014) further included 
mismatches arising from use of tenders and from high fill-rate requirements. Similarly, de 
Treville, Schuerhoff et al. (2014) showed that the Cost Differential Frontier model assuming 
lognormally distributed demand produced lower results than those calculated under 
assumptions of heavy-tailed demand, or of a stochastic instantaneous volatility. Thus, these two 
papers imply that, in most cases, it is safe to assume that the lognormal-based Cost Differential 
Frontier model represents a lower bound for the true cost differential or cost premium frontier. 
Biçer, Hagspiel and de Treville (2018) extended the model with the approach of “jumps” 
in demand knowledge, suggesting that as time passes and selling time gets closer, the 
uncertainty about demand does not necessarily decrease linearly or exponentially, but can 
suddenly change significantly as the result of events or new information, such as the result of a 
tender. They showed that approximating the forecast-evolution process by a constant 
instantaneous volatility process was acceptable when jumps are expected to decrease median 
demand, but that incorporating the jumps into the model made an important difference when a 




1.2.3) Volatility Portfolio 
Building on the Cost Differential Frontier model, de Treville, Catani and Saarinen (2017) 
argued that what is needed for competitiveness in high-cost countries is a volatility portfolio. 
They distinguished between two types of products. Products A are premium products with high 
margins and high demand volatility, while products C are basic products with low margins and 
low demand volatility, but they are both made by the same company using similar tools and 
skills. The model would attribute a high cost premium to product A and advise for local 
production, while it would attribute a low cost premium to product C and one could think it 
would better to make it offshore with a long lead-time and at the lowest possible cost. The 
authors proposed instead that production can be organized in the high-cost country in a way 
that creates a synergy between both types of products. To be responsive and capitalize on its 
market proximity, the factory needs to work with a capacity buffer, a capability for production 
that allows to respond to peak demands of product A. The capacity buffer is necessary but will 
not always be used – when the demand for product A is low. The authors suggest the best way 
to use this available capacity is to have an additional, complementary product, with lesser time 
constraints, that can be produced to stock instead of leaving the capacity idle when it is not used 
to make product A. These are the characteristics of product C.  
Making both products A and C in the same factory in a high-cost country is a way to 
balance capacity utilization by playing on their complementarity. The authors propose that the 
cost of the capacity buffer should be considered as an option cost assigned to product A. 
Therefore product C, which would result in a deficit if fully costed, becomes profitable if 
fixed costs – including labor – are paid by product A, which allows a manufacturer to be 
competitive in a high-cost country with a standard product at a low price point. 
The results of this research align with the growing awareness about reshoring, the 
opposite movement of offshoring: bringing back activities to the area they were originally 
located. Politics and society in general have started to understand the critical importance of 
having manufacturing activities in developed countries, in terms of jobs and innovation – both 
of which follow production as exemplified by the fact that 71% of U.S. patents come from 
manufacturing (Autor et al., 2016) – but also in terms of sustainability, social well-being and 
strategic reactivity in case of crisis.   
It is important to note that the reshoring process must be accompanied by a general 
rethinking of the company's operations strategy to be successful. A flexible approach to 




A common mistake observed in high-cost countries manufacturing is over-specialized 
automation and extreme, lean manufacturing. When pushed too far, this strategy creates 
constraints that reduce responsiveness. A production line that is designed to be the most 
efficient at making a specific product will be difficult to reconfigure to make another product, 
or simply to tweak to make variations of the base product, making it unable to leverage the 
proximity to market – to propose customized products, for example. Instead, companies 
should capitalize on skilled workers and the right level of automation to maximize 
responsiveness. 
A promising implementation of a responsive manufacturing organization is Seru, a 
Japanese name used to designate a set of cellular-manufacturing principles. Instead of using 
highly specialized production lines, Seru principles recommend creating versatile cells, with 
multi-purpose tools and skilled workers, that are easy to adapt to different jobs. Yin et al. 
(2017) described the advantages and successful implementation of Seru at Sony and Canon. 
Unlike lean manufacturing, the goal of Seru is not to maximize utilization and 
efficiency, but to foster adaptability and ability to innovate. A consequence is that cycle times, 
which define the average duration of the task each worker performs in the chain, and 
indirectly the share of the total work each worker accomplishes, are substantially longer in a 
Seru setting. Where a chain worker might have a single 5-second task – like gluing the screen 
of a smartphone in place – repeated for 10 hours daily, a Seru worker is able to perform a 
larger share of the manufacturing process of the same product. Skilled workers, along with the 
ability to constantly construct and disassemble cells based on orders that are received, is an 
example of how an on-demand local production can be implemented. 
In this thesis I use simulation-based trials to explore how these insights are 
incorporated into decision-making and explore the use of a simulation-game to facilitate their 









1.3) Human Decision-Making 
1.3.1) Bounded Rationality 
A second field of literature that was foundational to my research revolves around decision-
making, heuristics and biases. Behavioral factors have long been neglected in the field of 
economics. One of the pioneers is Herbert Simon, who introduced the idea of bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1955), stating that contrary to what has been assumed in most if not all 
economics theory, individuals are not maximizing their utility in their choices. Individuals 
have neither the computational power nor the full understanding of their environment and 
options necessary for such optimization. Assuming – or making the simplification – that they 
do is a significant flaw for any subsequent theory. Instead, Simon (1956) coins the term 
satisficing to refer to the individual's quest for outcomes that “permit satisfaction at some 
specified level” (p. 136) of a given goal, rather than the pursuit of an absolute optimal 
outcome that – if it even exists – would require to invest in the search a quantity of resources 
that exceeds what the individual can afford or is willing to invest. 
In his Nobel Prize lecture, Simon (1979) strongly encouraged research in decision-
making to go beyond the classic and outdated theory of rational agents. He proposed what a 
bounded rationality decision model could look like: “One procedure already mentioned is to 
look for satisfactory choices instead of optimal ones. Another is to replace abstract, global 
goals with tangible subgoals, whose achievement can be observed and measured. A third is to 
divide up the decision-making task among many specialists” (p. 501). Simon regretted that 
instead of rebuilding their models, the classical theorists had chosen to patch them with such 
artifices as Statistical Decision Theory and Game Theory. 
1.3.2) Heuristics and Biases 
Starting in the 1970s, the heuristics-and-biases program led by Kahneman and Tversky 
considerably developed the theory around bounded rationality decision-making, via 
experiences highlighting biases that can be linked to heuristics. Heuristics are defined as rules 
of thumbs, unconscious mental strategies to simplify our decision-making. They are 
recognized as useful, very often necessary, but rely on cognitive processes that can lead to 
systematic and, in some cases severe, errors. 
In their 1974 paper (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), they identified three main 




multiple experiments specifically designed to provoke mistakes by playing on the way each 
heuristic treats and simplifies information in the mind of the subject. They suggested that 
these mistakes, the biases, cannot easily be corrected and are robust to motivation, 
concentration, and even expertise on the topic. 
In a following work, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) insisted the invariance criterion 
of rational choice theory – same conditions should always lead to the same decisions – is not 
valid in real-life decisions. The normative properties of dominance, invariance, transitivity, 
and substitution that are set as basis of rational decision by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1947) are regularly violated by human decision-makers. 
Kahneman and Tversky cited the well-known and widely reproduced prospect theory 
in which people tend to display risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the 
domain of losses. They designed an experiment in which two options proposed to the 
decision-making subject are framed either as potential gains or potential losses. In this – 
farseeing – “Asian disease problem,” preferences between two disease-control programs were 
found to be reversed depending on whether the programs were presented in terms of deaths or 
lives saved, despite the fact outcomes were mathematically the same in both conditions. 
Kahneman (2003) later connected the work on heuristics to the dual-process theory. 
Dual-process theory (Chaiken & Trope, 1999) proposes a two-system view of decision-
making. System 1, or intuition, is fast, effortless, and automatic. System 2, or reasoning, is 
slower, effortful and conscious. System 1 is always active, producing intuitive judgements, 
that System 2 can either endorse without modification, adjust, correct or override. It can 
happen that no intuitive response comes to mind, in which case System 2 is directly activated. 
Becoming aware of potential biases can lead a decision-maker to rely more on System 2, but 
corrections are not straightforward and can be either insufficient or excessive. 
Kahneman argued this framework implies accessibility is paramount, as thoughts and 
impressions that are easily accessible – easy to think about – can influence the System 1 
initial judgement, and potentially the final decision, if not corrected efficiently by System 2. 
The same information can lead to different decisions depending on how a problem is framed 
to foster accessibility of a different idea. 
In this theory, the source of biases is a failure of System 2 in identifying and 
correcting a System 1 mistake. Hilbert (2012) suggested that in addition – or possibly on a 




fidelity in the storage of input evidence and retrieval for output estimate, is an “almost 
mechanical flaw” (p. 234). 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) unified the original three groups of heuristics via the 
hypothesis that they all share a fundamental mechanism called attribute substitution: “When 
confronted with a difficult question people often answer an easier one instead, usually without 
being aware of the substitution” (p. 53). This idea echoes what Simon (1979) described as a 
procedure to “replace abstract, global goals with tangible subgoals” (p. 501). 
Adopting attribute substitution as a root of heuristics function led the authors to 
replace the Anchoring class of heuristics – that did not work this way – with a more general 
Affect heuristic, suggesting we unconsciously attribute an affective value to every 
proposition, which can be used to make a decision for lack of a better criterion. The new 
definition of heuristic led the authors to argue that their use is widespread in diverse cases of 
decision-making, and not limited to decisions involving uncertainty. 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) also suggested factors that are susceptible to reduce 
biases, like statistical knowledge, intelligence attention and easily cognitively treatable format 
of information and attention. However, they insisted on the general robustness of biases, 
grounded in the imperfect functioning of System 1 and System 2. 
Kahneman and Tversky have a clinical and neutral approach to heuristics and biases, 
even though their experiments are oriented toward the points of failure that are biases. More 
recently, authors like Gigerenzer and Klein have brought a new approach to the study of 
decision-making, one that fully embraces the use of heuristics and does not necessarily 
consider it as a degraded process compared to a rational ideal. 
1.3.3) Fast and Frugal Heuristics 
Starting in the 1990s, the fast-and-frugal heuristics program led by Gigerenzer challenged the 
heuristics-and-biases research strategy. A deep controversy exists between the two research 
programs about the goals pursued in human decision-making study, the adopted frameworks, 
and the nature of biases. 
Gigerenzer (1996) articulates his assertion that the heuristics-and-biases program fell 
short of its goal of understanding human cognitive processes around two main criticisms. 
First, the heuristics proposed are too vague, and do not result neither in testable models, nor in 
specifications of the conditions in which each heuristic is active. Second, the observed 




acknowledge the context of the decision and sometimes treat single-events with tools aimed at 
mathematical probabilities.  
While the heuristics-and-biases program focuses on demonstrating cognitive fallacies 
at an abstract level and consider biases as a price to pay when using heuristics, the fast-and-
frugal heuristics program investigates human decisions in their context, and aims at 
understanding why, how and in what environment can specific heuristics be performant and 
resources efficient. While Kahneman (2003) insists on the robustness of biases, Gigerenzer 
(1991) shows that the problem structure is paramount and that some biases can simply be 
eliminated through attention. 
The dual-process theory is also subject to controversy, both about its intrinsic 
assumption that intuitive judgments are generally less accurate than consciously reasoned 
judgements, and about its very relevance as a theoretical framework. Keren and Schul (2009) 
argue that the definition of the two processes are not rigorous and not empirically valid, as the 
criteria that are supposed to distinguish between system 1 and system 2 – such as the speed of 
processing or level of awareness – form a continuum rather than a dichotomy, opening the 
door to an arbitrary number of systems depending only on how the bounds are set. Kruglanski 
and Gigerenzer (2011) propose a unified theory of judgment based on the idea that both 
systems are in fact rule-based, that these rules are common, selected according to individual's 
attention capacity, processing motivation and perceived fit with the problem, among a set of 
options constrained by the task features and the individual memory. 
Gigerenzer and his ABC research group (1999) approach heuristics as a toolbox. We 
constantly face choices in an environment where information is incomplete, missing, 
overabundant, noisy, ambiguous or erroneous, and our own computing power is limited, as is 
the time we have to make decisions. Therefore, what we need are processes that are fast and 
frugal – in terms of amount of input and computation requirements – and the use of heuristics 
is rational in the way that it responds to this need.  
Heuristics allows us to direct information search, decide when to stop the search, and 
select among the options available with our limited abilities, knowledge and time. 
The success of the use of heuristics depends on our ability to pick the right one in the 
toolbox for the right task. Matching the right heuristic with the right decision, to take 
advantage of the structure of information at hand, is what the authors call “Ecological 
Rationality.” In a specific environment, the right heuristic can outperform a complex rational 




Marewski, Gaissmaier and Gigerenzer (2010) add to the idea that complex problems 
require simple decision processes through the angle of robustness. While a very sophisticated 
decision model would beat a simpler one at fitting past data, when this historical data is not all 
meaningful for the current decision, or mixed with irrelevant noise, overfit will decrease the 
model's generalizability to new problems. Counterintuitively, the less precise prediction of the 
simpler model ends up being more accurate than the artificial convolutions of the complex 
model. The authors note that noisiness in the input and feedback information of our decisions 
is all the more prominent that we live in an ever more complex world of uncertainty. 
The distinction between risk and uncertainty is fundamental in the ecological 
rationality framework and the discussion about relevance and performance of heuristics. In a 
situation of risk, possible outcomes, as well as their respective probability, are known, which 
opens the possibility of mathematical optimization (Knight, 1921). In a situation of 
uncertainty “not all alternatives, consequences, and probabilities are known” (Hafenbrädl et 
al., 2016, p. 217) to the decision maker, which makes mathematical optimization unfeasible 
(Mousavi & Gigerenzer, 2017). Mousavi and Gigerenzer (2014, p. 1671) argue that in 
situations of uncertainty, using a heuristic with the best possible “functional matches between 
cognition and environment” is the best course of action, not just a degraded backup strategy. 
Gigerenzer et al. (1999) propose a classification of heuristics based on types of application:  
• Ignorance-based heuristics, a less-is-more approach in which the subject knows very 
little about the problem and focuses on searching for recognizable features.  
• One-Reason heuristics, a simplification process of the problem to one of its 
dimensions, of which the Take-the-best heuristic is a well-known example. 
• Elimination heuristics, to select between options or categories using one cue at a time. 
• Satisficing, setting a level of aspiration and committing to select the first option that 
satisfies it, is useful when options are not all on the table at the same time and may 
become unavailable as time advances. 
Gigerenzer and his ABC research group presented a collection of examples, from 
animal behavior to human romantic partner selection and stock-market investment, and their 
experiments showed impressive performances from the simple heuristics. In many cases, 
decision-makers can take advantage of the structure of information of their environment to 
generate options, stop the search, analyze the options and select a satisfying one, all of that in 
a short time and at a low cognitive cost. But the research program also investigates when and 




Gigerenzer (2003) explored real-life examples illustrating how the human difficulties 
in dealing with uncertainty can lead to misguided choices, by obfuscating the relevant 
representation of information that would allow an ecologically rational reasoning. He cited 
innumeracy, the “inability to reason about uncertainties and risk” (p. 24), as a critical source 
of errors in a wide range of decisions, including public policies, medical treatment decisions 
and criminal investigation. 
Innumeracy casts a light on the relevance of the fast-and-frugal heuristics programs in 
education. Gigerenzer (2003) suggests part of the problem is that mathematical education 
focuses mainly on algebra, geometry and calculus: tools for working with certainties. 
Statistics are taught – at best – as formulas and procedures, but students are never given the 
opportunity to understand them on a deeper level, to recognize uncertainty in daily events, to 
estimate degrees of risks and to turn data into manageable and intuition-compatible 
representations. 
I consider this last aspect about representation of information critical, and in my 
opinion, it is underlying in all the literature about heuristics. The benefit of heuristics is to 
allow the human mind to get a workable representation of information. 
1.3.4) Experts’ Sources of Power 
Klein (2001) also studied the way people make decisions in real settings under time and 
resources constraints. The Naturalistic Decision-Making framework seeks to answer: What 
are people doing when they are not using deductive logical thinking, analysis of probabilities 
and statistical methods?   
Klein shares a lot with Gigerenzer: the importance of the environment and its 
idiosyncratic structure, the idea of satisficing, the very positive view of the use of heuristics 
and the consideration of biases as a minor issue compared to the benefits. He called the 
naturalistic decision-making methods “sources of power” and highlighted their use by experts 
in various domains like firefighters, pilots, military leaders, nurses.  
His hypothesis is that while beginners might want to use a more classical and 
rationally structured decision process, experts have developed skills that allow then to use 
efficient heuristics and make better decisions with fewer resources. They do not become 
better at using a heavy formal process, instead they develop ad-hoc processes based on 




considering options, or even like they are making decisions, they feel like the best course of 
action comes to mind intuitively and automatically.  
To illustrate it with an evocative example: professional tennis players are so good at 
returning a tennis ball not because they are better than average people at computing the 
mathematical function of the trajectory of the ball, but because they developed excellent and 
efficient intuitive processes. 
This finding is counterintuitive as we might expect beginners to jump on the first 
option they can think of, when it is, in fact, experts who can generate a single course of action 
that will work, while novices need to compare different approaches. 
Becoming an expert requires the development of perceptual skills linked to the 
decision environment. Accumulating experience, although it is not sufficient – the process to 
turn experience into a big-picture vision is not widely agreed upon – is necessary, and Klein 
suggests that simulations are a valuable training tool, as they give easy, on-demand access to 
various meaningful situations that would otherwise take years to encounter and digested into 
expertise, they can speed up the training. 
Klein (2001) identified three main “sources of power”: 
• Intuition, the non-conscious perception or recognition a pattern or situation is not 
right, without necessarily being able to precisely define the problem. 
• Mental simulation, the ability to create a mental representation of a solution and assess 
if it could work, or what would go wrong, then jump to the next idea, until satisficing. 
• Stories, to make sense of what led to the current situation and what can possibly 
happen next. 
The author argued human decision-making is fundamentally a satisficing – as opposed 
to optimizing – process. We do not filter through all possible options but merely channel from 
one opportunity to another, sometimes even considering only one option. The goals are not 
fixed from the beginning of the decision process, but are rather refined or redefined along the 
way. Just like in Gigerenzer’s (1999) view, the context and previous experiences of the 
decision-maker are paramount in selecting an accurate strategy. 
Klein defines a bad decision as one for which we not only regret the outcome, but also, 
and more importantly, the process. In the Naturalistic Decision-Making framework, mistakes 
do not come from biases in the way we think, but rather from a lack of expertise or a faulty 
design of the problem that does not allow it to be correctly understood, coming back to the 




1.3.5) Managerial and Entrepreneurial Decision-Making 
Armed with this theoretical basis on heuristics and biases, I searched for literature about the 
application of heuristics and biases in the management field in general and in offshoring 
decisions in particular. 
Entrepreneurs are often singled out as a subject for managerial decision-making 
studies, as they face many choices, and are “more susceptible to the use of decision-making 
biases and heuristics than managers in large organizations” (Buzenitz & Barney, 1997, p. 9). 
According to the authors, the difference between entrepreneurs and managers is not 
about demographic, personal or psychological differences, but in the decision-making process 
they use. Much like the ecological rationality in the work of Gigerenzer, using heuristics is 
what allows them to thrive in an environment that would otherwise be overwhelming, and in 
which “the window of opportunity would often be gone by the time all the necessary 
information became available for more rational decision-making” (p. 10). 
Baron (1998) concurred that the key to entrepreneurs’ decision-making is not personal 
characteristics, as entrepreneurs are not different from the average person from a personality 
point of view, but the cognitive processes they use: “How, in the terms of cognitive 
psychology, they attempt to make sense of the complex world around them” (p. 277). 
Entrepreneurs do not have a greater willingness to take risks, or more optimism. Rather, they 
work in an environment where they are prone to more uncertainty, pressure, information 
overload, and are therefore in a position to often use heuristics in their decision-making 
processes, and consequently be subject to more biases. The author listed five examples of 
biases – counterfactual thinking, affect infusion, attributional style, planning fallacy, self-
justification – and designated them as the source of wrong decisions, rather than personality 
traits like overconfidence. The good news, according to Baron, is that thinking patterns are 
easier to change than traits. 
Forbes (2005) studied the overconfidence bias and compared how it affected 
company-founder entrepreneurs compared to non-founder managers. He defined 
overconfidence as “the degree to which people do not know what they do not know” (p. 626). 
The author discovered founders are indeed more overconfident that non-founders, but also 
that age, low organizational decision structure and presence of external investors reduce the 
degree of overconfidence exhibited by decision-makers, while overall self-confidence does 
not have an impact. His conclusion is in line with Baron (1998): Individual personalities of 




making. Rather, cognitive processes – both from self-selection for the job and as a 
consequence of the environment of such job – play a major role. 
Simon et al. (2000) stated it is a paradox that entrepreneurs are willing to take the high 
risk of starting businesses if they do not have a risk-seeking personality. They made the 
hypothesis that risk-perception, rather than willingness to take risks, could explain the 
decision to start a company, and they designed a laboratory experiment around a case study to 
validate this hypothesis and assess the role of several cognitive biases on risk perception. 
They found support for the hypothesis that lower risk perception is associated with the 
willingness to start a venture. They also identified illusion of control – the belief that one's 
skills can increase performance in a situation actually ruled by chance – and belief in the law 
of small numbers – drawing conclusion from a too small sample of inputs – as associated with 
lower risk-perception. The same two biases – although the law of small number was replaced 
by a more general “representativeness bias” but with a close definition – that were identified 
by Busenitz and Barney (1997). 
In addition to their findings, this article discusses an interesting point of methodology, 
as they wished to study managerial decision-making in a laboratory experiment setting. On 
the relevance of laboratory experiments to study such strategic decisions as offshoring, they 
built upon Schwenk (1995), arguing that although the laboratory setting has flaws – artificial 
context, low stakes and pressure, college students subjects – it has value in allowing direct 
observation of decision-making, as opposed to retrospective accounts, often biased (Huber & 
Power, 1985; Schwenk, 1986) and artificially rationalized. A well-designed laboratory 
experiment has the potential for establishing causalities that would be impossible to determine 
via real-world observation. 
Gray et al. (2017) followed the offshoring process of nine companies seeking lower 
costs. Initially, the companies’ decision process followed what the authors called a “Lowest 
per-unit landed cost” (p. 38) heuristic, meaning they focused only on the face value of unit 
costs, excluding all other factors that would make the decision too complicated. Six of the 
nine companies later reversed the process and reshored their activity, based on a more 
comprehensive analysis of supply-chain costs, which is a very costly way to acquire a broader 
understanding of offshoring costs. 
Larsen et al. (2013) identified the complexity of offshoring as a driver of cost-
estimation errors leading to a “wrong” offshoring, in the sense that is it later regretted and 




made less costs savings than expected, despite the fact they studied services offshoring such 
as IT, call centers and administrative services, for which offshoring is arguably easier and 
more predictable than industrial offshoring. They also suggested that the driving force behind 
the decision, a strategic move rather than an opportunistic one based only on costs savings, 
has an impact on the success of the outcome, and its predictability. 
Petit et al. (2010) drew a parallel between human behavior and animal behavior. They 
studied collective movements and the point when a group of animals decides to move from 
one spot to another. The authors argue that external conditions alone do not explain the trigger 
of such movements, and that besides leadership, a mimetic-based group process is at play. 
Each animal interacts with a limited number of peers through cues or signals, creating a 
distributed network of information. It is only when and if a certain threshold in the number of 
individuals in the group who want to move is reached that the group movement starts. 
It is easy to see a parallel with the industry migration to China over the last 30 years. 
Each manager is influenced both by a few leader figures and by the peers he is in contact 
with, and when a certain threshold in the number of companies that offshore is reached, a 
tipping point occurs and the rest of the herd follows. 
Moreover, several studies found that group decisions, as opposed to decisions taken 
individually, tend to foster more risk-taking (Blascovich & Ginsburg, 1974;  Lamm, 
Trommsdorff, & Rost-Schaude, 1972), especially if the members of the group have an 
individual risk-taking tendency (Gardner & Steinberg, 2005). 
Hahn et al. (2009) found that decision-makers in the information system industry, 
when faced with offshoring decisions, tend to imitate the leaders, learn by successive trials 
and errors and progressively go to riskier places as they gain experience. They also pointed 
out the role of environment trends, like an industry-wide movement that creates a pressure 
and fear of falling behind and triggers a “defensive” offshoring decision rationalized as an 
unavoidable necessity. As the peer effect seemed particularly relevant to offshoring decision, 
I decided to include it in my trial. 
Musteen (2016) interviewed 22 top managers from small- and medium-size companies 
in various industries – information technology, life sciences, furniture, fashion and electronics 
– who faced an offshoring decision. Her intent was to assess how much of the decisions were 
based on a rational and comprehensive process – like computing costs, risks, market or talent 




considered behavioral factors in a broad sense of the term: influences of decision-makers’ 
experiences, attitudes, emotions, cognitive limitations. 
Seventeen of the 22 managers openly recognized and described using non-economic 
factors in making their decisions. The author classified these factors in three categories: 
previous personal experiences, personal attitudes and emotions and cognitive limitations. The 
personal attitudes and emotions categories contained a lot of reference to social responsibility 
and patriotic pride of the managers, which led me to include these aspects in my trial. 
Das and Teng (1999) found that different modes of strategic decisions – rationality, 
avoidance, logical incrementation, political, randomness – lead to different biases in the 
process, but that no mode is immune. Not even one aspiring to rationality, as is it commonly 
subject to prior hypothesis and limited targets as well as creating an illusion of manageability. 
Schoenherr, Rao Tummala and Harrison (2008) collaborated with a company in an 
action research project to develop a comprehensive and arguably rational framework for 
evaluating offshoring options. They used an algorithm for multi-criteria decision-making 
under uncertainty called Analytic Hierarchy Process to evaluate five alternatives for sourcing 
and assembly involving a combination of China, Mexico and the U.S. 
The authors, using thorough interviews with the company and literature, listed 17 risk 
factors, with lead-time and mismatch costs being one of them, and weighted their importance. 
Ultimately, they benchmarked the relative performance of each alternative across the 17 
factors and recommended the best options after consistency checks. 
Their work is interesting not only for the risk-factors list they produced, but also 
because they showed what a comprehensive decision process would entail for a company: one 
year of committed work in collaboration with researchers and the use of complex algorithms 
the company does not master on its own.  And this applies in the optimal case of a company 
that has already defined a limited list of offshoring alternatives. As such, it exemplified why 
such a process goes beyond the capabilities or willingness of most companies. 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) conducted a laboratory study on the Newsvendor 
problem, a classic Operations management optimization problem in which participants have 
to decide on an order quantity for a unique sales period based on a stochastic demand function 
and the price, cost and salvage value of a product. Participants were found to order too many 
low-profit products and too few high-profit ones, as compared to the expected profit-
maximizing order quantity. The authors attributed these errors to a heuristic that would favor 




insufficient adjustment heuristic – with the mean as an anchor and a tendency to repeat the 
same order or insufficiently adjust toward the optimal order quantity. 
This study is particularly close to what I want to do with my trials in the sense that it 
compares participants’ decisions to a benchmark model to analyze their deviations, and 
investigates the heuristics susceptible to cause these deviations. In my case, the decision can 
be summarized as “how much are participants willing to pay to avoid facing the Newsvendor 
problem?” and the benchmark is given by the Cost Differential Frontier model by de Treville, 



















1.4) Active Learning and Simulation-Games 
1.4.1) Active Learning 
An important part of my work has been the development of a simulation-game to help teach 
and communicate the results of research on the value of lead-time. 
This simulation-game artifact – not to be confused with the simulation I use in my trials 
on offshoring decision-making – is part of a teaching approach called Active Learning. This 
chapter gives an overview of the literature about Active Learning and simulation-games that 
inspired its development, while my artifact is described in detail in Chapter 4. 
Active Learning is not a precise learning method, but a broad approach that encompasses 
diverse practices where the learner is an active player in the learning process, as opposed to the 
classic ex-cathedra lecture.  
Prince (2004) proposed a meta-analysis of different types of Active Learning in the 
context of engineering teaching, and identified four types of methods: 
• Student engagement, by breaking lessons with participative activities. 
• Collaborative learning, with students working in a group toward a goal.  
• Cooperative learning, group work with individual assessment. 
• Problem-based teaching, by introducing problems before theory to provide context 
and motivation. 
The author found extensive empirical support for all forms of Active Learning, 
measured not only in terms of academic achievement – test results – but also in terms of 
students’ attitude improvement, as well as better retention of material compared to traditional 
lectures. 
To go further on problem-based learning, Kapur and Lee (2009) explored how 
productive failure in mathematical problem solving could help students better assimilate the 
material. The concept of productive failure is to reverse the conventional instruction process, 
by challenging students with complex, ill-structured problems before receiving the relevant 
instructions and lecture content, with the intent to create a situation in which students will fail 
to produce satisfactory solutions but will be familiarized with key concepts that will allow for 
a more effective subsequent learning. An ill-structured problem is one where the initial state, 
the goals and the possible steps toward these goals are uncertain, undefined or subject to the 




The authors opened the question as to when it is optimal to start giving structure in the 
learning process. While the traditional teaching model starts with a lot of structure at the 
beginning of the learning then gradually reduces it, Kapur and Lee suggest that delaying 
structure gives space to “learner-generated processing, conceptions, representations, and 
understandings” (p. 2633). Making mistakes or being stuck prompts the learner to use prior 
knowledge to fill the gaps, try to build links, be active from a cognitive point of view. Material 
learned this way builds a stronger degree of confidence in the learner.  
An experiment was conducted on Grade 7 – 12- to 13-year-old – students, where one 
group had traditional lectures guided by the course workbook, and the other group used the 
same amount of time on ill-structured problem-solving attempts – and in most cases failing – 
alternating with consolidation sessions with the teacher. At the end of the learning period, both 
groups were tested on the material through two types of problems: basic well-structured items, 
and complex items. “Productive failure” condition students scored higher on both types of 
problems, with a difference particularly important on complex items. The authors concluded, 
consistent with Prince, that productive failure leads to a deeper understanding and appropriation 
of the material, and therefore an ability to reuse the knowledge in complex situations. 
Another way of making students active in the learning process is testing. Little and Bjork 
(2011) demonstrated how to take advantage of tests not only to assess learning, but also to 
enhance learning through pretesting, testing learners on a material before teaching it.  
It has already been shown (Kornell, Hays, & Bjork, 2009; Richland, Kornell, & Kao, 
2009; Rothkopf, 1966; Soderstrom et al., 2014) that taking a test before studying can improve 
learning of the pretested information, but Little and Bjork went further in showing that 
pretesting improves recall of both tested information and non-tested related information.  
The authors found that pretesting facilitates subsequent learning of the material by 
fostering involvement and helping identify the most important pieces of information and their 
relevance. The attempt itself changes the way we think and store future information, as 
retrieving a fact from our memory is not like opening a computer file, instead it alters our brain 
organization. Therefore, pretesting primes the brain, predisposes it to absorb new information, 
and helps hierarchize the thinking. 
Multiple-choice questions appear to be the best suited format of pretesting as it is 
important that the students are at least able to consider plausible alternatives – a total absence 
of grasp of the material would not trigger intellectual activity. Moreover, multiple-choice 




the other alternatives are incorrect. The format helps fight the illusion of fluency effect: thinking 
that an answer is obvious when learning the material, but being confused when other plausible 
answers are proposed. 
A short test can be organized at the beginning of a class session. It is well documented 
(Hartley & Cameron 1967; MacManaway 1970) that the signal to noise ratio in a traditional 
lecture is far from ideal, with students’ attention declining after ten minutes and only about 20% 
of the content presented being memorized. Lang (2016) suggested the first five minutes of a 
class determines, consciously or not, the degree of interest and focus students will invest in the 
session, and teachers often waste this critical moment on administrative or logistical tasks. 
Instead, the author suggested asking a question that will be answered by the lecture or asking 
about what was learned in a previous session to reactivate the content in mind. 
All the methods mentioned above can be applied in the context of a flipped classroom 
approach (Gilboy et al., 2015). In a flipped classroom setting, a lot of the theoretical content 
learning takes places outside the classroom, typically through such online media as video 
lectures and notes prepared by the teacher, which allows for self-paced acquisition of the base 
knowledge. Class time is then dedicated to activities and discussions among students – who 
already possess some knowledge on the topic – and the teacher. This interaction aims at building 
on the theoretical content and deepening the understanding and ability to use it in real-life 
settings, a task for which Active Learning methods are well suited. 
The success of an Active Learning approach depends on the ability of the teacher to 
create content, foster interactivity and adapt the session to audience reactions while maintaining 
clarity on the purpose of each lecture and activity. These are challenging requirements that draw 
on skills different from the ones needed in traditional teaching methods (Yordanova et al., 
2015). Creating quality interactive content requires a lot of effort, but is powerful in the sense 
that it is easily scalable, reusable and adaptable to online teaching. 
1.4.2) Simulation-Games 
Another tool that holds an important place in the Active Learning portfolio is a simulation-
game. Computer-based serious games and simulations have seen a booming development over 
the past 30 years, as the democratization of information technologies simplified their diffusion 
and usage, while an easier access for practitioners and subject-matter experts to programming 




Serious games on managerial topics are numerous and cover the full spectrum of 
disciplines and industries (e.g.: Commercial strategy (Ncube, 2010), Marketing (Bascoul et al., 
2013), Project Management (Vanhoucke, Vereecke & Gemmel, 2005), Business Models 
(Tantan, Lang & Boughzala, 2015), Aeronautics (Proctor, Bauer & Lucario, 2007), Healthcare 
(Ribeiro et al., 2012), Crisis-management (Meesters & Van de Walle, 2013), Military (Zyda et 
al., 2005)). In the supply-chain field, the Beer Distribution Game (Sterman, 1989) developed 
by Jay W. Forrester at MIT in the 1960s to illustrate the Bullwhip effect is an early, and still 
influential, example. 
Simulation-games require active participation from the learner. They are a type of 
problem-based learning that embeds the theoretical content in a more or less – at the teacher's 
discretion – structured scenario. Just like pretesting, simulation-games can be used as a priming 
tool, before theoretical learning, and generate productive failure and discussion. There is no 
consensus in literature over the terminology to designate these artifacts: “game,” “simulation,” 
“simulation-game,” “serious game,” among other options, are often used interchangeably. 
However, some authors have attempted to set definitions and the debate is instructive in the 
way it identifies fundamental attributes in a booming field that still lacks standards.  
The dictionary definition (Flexner, 1970) of a game is “a competitive activity involving 
skill, chance, or endurance, played by two or more persons according to a set of rules, usually 
for their own amusement or for that of spectators.” In that way, it is a close activity to problem 
solving in the sense of Simon (1996), summarized by Hevner et al. (2004, p. 88) as follows: 
“utilizing available means to reach desired ends while satisfying laws existing in the 
environment.” Playing is a fundamental human activity, it is, after all, one way babies discover 
their environment and acquire skills.  
Sauvé et al. (2007) built on several definitions found in the literature to identify 
attributes of games: player(s), a conflict or cooperation dynamic, rules, a goal and an artificial 
nature. If the game is to be educational, it includes an extra pedagogy attribute, a purpose 
beyond winning (Mitgutsch & Alvarado, 2012). 
On the other side of the spectrum, simulations are models of reality defined as systems. 
These models must be dynamic, simplified as compared to reality, but accurate and valid.  If 
the simulation is to be educational, it includes learning objectives. 
Games imply active participation of the player, including decision-making, while it is 
not necessarily the case with simulations. In general, the learning aspect in a simulation tends 




The literature is not unanimous on the importance of artificiality in games. Some authors 
like Ncube (2010) argue that an artifact, like the Lemonade game in her study, is a simulation 
because rules of reality apply, and it refers to reality. Other authors like Zyda (2005) ignore this 
attribute and would rather qualify it as a game. 
Ellington (1981) suggested many of the artifacts we are talking about belong to a 
category where the definitions overlap – a winning aspect and a representation of real life – and 
that an appropriate name is simulation-games. I adopted this fitting terminology for my own 
artifact, but the debate and confusion live on in the literature, not to mention in practice. 
The fact that reality is simplified and stripped of some aspects is a common pushback 
from practitioners when trying a simulation-game, and their focus goes right to the missing 
aspects that constitute the complexity of their jobs. However, abstraction and simplification of 
the real-life problem are necessary to focus on one aspect of reality, especially for teaching 
purposes. This simplification of some aspects and magnification of others is a purposeful 
feature of serious games and simulations, not a bug. Van der Zee and Slomp (2009) explained 
that simulation-games can be complementary and sometimes even preferred to on-the-job 
training in some companies because they allow isolation of a particular aspect – 
communication, cooperation or negotiation – that would otherwise be implicit and hidden, as 
well as replay and what-if scenarios. 
When teaching more abstract notions like statistical reasoning, counterintuitive and non-
linear effects, simulation-games have several strengths that make them useful tools. Through 
experience and trial and error, simulation-games de-ice the misconceptions of the player and 
help “shift learner’s personal paradigms” (Ncube, 2010, p. 568). They make it possible for the 
teacher to present situations that are rare in a natural setting but have the potential, when 
presented at the right time in the teaching process, to let the learner gain experience and, more 
importantly, expertise in the sense of Klein (2001). Thanks to immediate feedback, they allow 
for a clear understanding of cause and effect (Van der Zee & Slomp, 2009) and build confidence 
as the learner’s skills develop. Their dynamic aspect – the model behind the game responds to 
players actions – makes them an effective way to acquire a global or systemic perspective of 
phenomena (Pasin & Giroux, 2011; Machuca, 2000). Their exploratory nature – playing and 
understanding occurs at the same time – fosters intrinsic motivation (Saethang & Kee, 1998; 
Sauvé et al., 2007). 
Many studies showed positive results in the use of simulation-games in teaching 




(2007) showed effectiveness when teaching Physiology to non-science major students; Gosen 
and Washbush (2004) found improvement in exam scores for undergraduate business students 
after use of a simulation-game; Dunbar et al. (2014) successfully applied serious games for 
mitigating the cognitive biases of individuals making decisions under uncertainty; Coller and 
Scott (2009) and Coller and Shernoff (2009) found more engagement when using serious 
games. 
1.4.3) Limits in Artifact Evaluation 
The main issue in the modern profusion of simulation-games is that many studies miss the target 
of showing their artifact is the appropriate teaching tool. The problem often lies in the 
evaluation of these tools, on two different levels.  
First, the theoretical evaluation of the quality of the conceptual design is too often 
confused with the evaluation of the quality of the game (Mitgutsch & Alvarado, 2012). The 
question “Is it efficient at making the intended teaching point?” is often replaced by the simpler 
but less accurate question: “Is it a good game?” According to Mitgutsch and Alvarado, a key 
design element is the fit between the gameplay and the learning point. Conceptual design of a 
serious game should be made so that the style serves the content and both merge in a way that 
makes sense for the player. Putting an entertainment part and a learning part side by side does 
not make an effective serious game. Several frameworks exist to assess simulation-games – 
ARCS (Keller, 1987), DGBL (Prensky, 2001), SGDA (Mitgutsch & Alvarado, 2012) – but none 
emerges as a standard.  
Secondly, experimental evaluation of the impact of serious games is often overlooked 
or incorrectly targeted. Conducting proper A/B testing on a randomly divided class through a 
semester, as did Kapur and Lee (2009), is organizationally complex and often against university 
rules, inciting simulation-game developers and practitioners to use less comprehensive 
approaches. A common evaluation method is distributing a questionnaire to participants (e.g.: 
Tantan, Lang & Boughzala, 2015; Arisha & Tobail, 2013), but this method limits the feedback 
to the feeling of participants toward the game, their degree of satisfaction with it as an activity 
or with the quality of its interface, or their self-assessment of the improvement of their 
understanding. It is poised to mix appreciation of the experience and learning effects.  
Another common evaluation process is to compare the results of the participants on the 
first rounds of a game versus the last rounds (Pasin & Giroux, 2011). The bias here is that 




underlying teaching point. It is normal to become better at a game – be it serious or not – by 
getting a better grasp at the gameplay aspects, or in the worst cases, by memorizing the right 
answers. Therefore, it is “inappropriate to assess simulations using performance as a measure 
of learning” (Gosen & Washbush, 2004, p. 273). 
Developing evaluation methods, as well as frameworks that would accurately assess 
conceptual design quality while being general enough to become a recognized standard in the 
field would be a major step forward, but is complicated by the immense variety of artifacts and 
the discrepancy in their definitions (Sauvé et al., 2007). 
1.4.4) Lead-Time Manager 
The second part of my work in this thesis, presented in chapter 4, is the development of a 
simulation-game called Lead-Time Manager, that aims at facilitating teaching and 
communication of the research insights about the value of shortening lead-time and increasing 
supply-chain responsiveness to reduce mismatch costs. 
The challenges in transmitting this content are multiple. First, learners need to acquire 
a statistical and theoretical toolbox, including the Newsvendor model, volatility and fill rate 
calculations, and expected profit calculation. But beyond these skills, a full mastery of the 
content requires a deep shift in the learner's thinking process toward the offshoring problem, an 
upgrade to the learner's heuristic toolbox. It requires to deal with uncertainty that is not always 
reducible to risks, to acknowledge the existence of rare events, to overcome the intuitive 
attraction to lower unit costs to get a broader view of hidden costs, to see through blurred 
cause/consequences chains and to make sense of non-linear effects. 
My goal is to leverage Active Learning methods to facilitate this knowledge 
transmission and prepare students and practitioners to apply the content to real life situations. 
But in order to build an effective teaching tool, I need to better understand the pitfalls, the 
naturalistic way this offshoring decision is treated by people. To build a tool that takes learners 
from where they are and brings them to a state where they are better-equipped and able to make 
an informed-choice, I need to identify where they are to begin with, what kind of tools they 
pick in their heuristic toolbox when faced with an offshoring decision. To that end, the first part 
of my work is an exploratory diagnosis of the decision processes at play, through two laboratory 






2) Biases in Assessing Uncertainty: Exploration 
of Operations Management Decision-Making 
2.1) Introduction 
Economists used to consider decision-making a pure, cognitive application of mathematics. 
Decision-makers were assumed to be completely rational, able and willing to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of their environment and all its relevant variables before 
computing an optimal choice. 
Luckily, such concepts have evolved, starting in the 1950s with the introduction of the 
Bounded Rationality concept by Herbert Simon (1955, 1979), and enriched by the work of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) on heuristics in the 1970s. 
The research community switched from a normative and unrealistic model of the human 
brain as a rational computer to the acceptance of Behavioral Economics as a theory that is more 
accurate in describing how we really make decisions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), without 
pretending to predict or even fully understand human choices. 
Heuristics are a central element of modern research on decision-making. Heuristics can 
be defined as “rules of thumb,” a set of thinking-methods that rely on systematic procedures to 
categorize, judge and simplify decisions. Heuristics are multiple, and although we can sort them 
in a handful of large categories (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), 
each instance is specific to a narrow range of situations. Indeed, heuristics are efficient to the 
extent that they take advantage of the structure of information in the environment at hand 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999).  
This powerful and generally efficient tool, however, comes with a downside: bias. As 
the same main heuristics are widespread, they lead to recurrent mistakes, systematic deviations 
from optimality. The mechanisms behind biases are not unanimously agreed upon. Proposed 
reasons include failure of conscious cognition to spot and correct errors of intuitive thinking 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1974), oversimplification due to the substitution process in heuristics 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) and the noisy information processing of human memory 
(Hilbert, 2012). Not only do biases lead to suboptimal decisions, but their systematic nature 
puts the decision-maker at risk of being predictable, or even manipulated. 
Despite the richness of this research field, students in business and economics still learn, 
and managers still use, models that assume actors’ rationality in a classical sense, accepting this 




I decided to focus on the case of heuristics and biases in a specific managerial decision: 
offshoring. Economic offshoring can be summarized as the choice between continuing to 
produce locally, where the company sells its products, or move to a country with cheaper labor. 
This decision presents a difficult tradeoff between low unit costs and the increase in lead-time 
with uncertainty about demand as the orders must be made earlier. 
Other hidden costs exist beyond supply and demand mismatch, including intellectual 
property risks, transportation risks and costs, communication issues, loss of innovation, and 
quality issues. The literature (Musteen, 2016) also suggests social factors, like social 
externalities and reputation considerations, can complicate offshoring decisions.  
I argue that because it involves a rich and complex environment, many variables and 
high stakes, offshoring is a good example of the need for a comprehensive and structured 
decision process as exemplified in Schoenherr, Rao Tummala and Harrison (2008). 
Recent studies (de Treville, Schuerhoff et al., 2014; de Treville, Bicer et al., 2014) have 
shown the value of local production and risks of offshoring from the point of view of lead-time 
and volatility of demand. 
A tool – Cost Differential Frontier (http://cdf-oplab.unil.ch) – was developed by de 
Treville et al. to help decision-makers deal with a counterintuitive choice that must balance two 
competing factors: unit costs and volatility of demand. Taking simple information on price, 
cost, residual value and volatility of demand as inputs, it gives an estimation of the supply and 
demand mismatch cost when increasing lead-time. 
My goal is to study offshoring through the lens of heuristics and biases, and probe for 
deviations from rationality in offshoring decision-making processes. To that end, I designed 
and coded a computer-based simulation that puts the participant in the role of a manager facing 
an offshoring decision. I manipulate costs and demand volatility to create scenarios that could 
be optimally solved with the Cost Differential Frontier tool – not provided to participants – and 
compare the optimal strategy with participants’ choices.  
The task proposes an offshoring decision that is heavily simplified, stripped of many 
aspects to focus on mismatch costs. Unlike in real world, financial parameters are precisely 
defined and demand is modeled by a specific function, which effectively simplifies what would 
normally be a situation of high uncertainty to a situation of risk, and allows for the computation 
of an optimal solution, at least from the experimenter point of view. However, for the participant 
who is assumed to be unaware of the Cost Differential Frontier solution, the possible outcomes 




consequences are unclear, which puts them in a situation of uncertainty rather than risk, and 
opens the way to the use of heuristics. 
My work lies within the tradition of Kahneman and Tversky in the sense that I intend to 
use a mathematically optimal solution as the rational benchmark and observe heuristics as 
deviations. This optimal solution will be computed based on a simplification of the problem, 
and using the assumptions and model from Treville, Cattani and Saarinen (2017), as will be 
explained in the next chapter. However, my method should not be interpreted as presenting 
heuristics as inferior decision strategies, but rather as a detection protocol, a way to cast a light 
of the heuristics used in this offshoring decision context. A decision strategies ranking would 
require to precisely understand the knowledge, motivation and resources of participants to 
determine their ecological rationality in this situation. 
If participants can solve the offshoring problem, or use intuition and reach a result that 
satisfies them, this would suggest that a heuristic exists that is performant for this task. If not, 
it would highlight the need for teaching and decision-helping tools. 
 
My research is guided by several questions:  
• Are participants able to formulate a rational solution for a complex offshoring problem? 
• Are participants able to evaluate the cost of uncertainty and volatility?  
• Are participants aiming at mathematically optimal choices? 
• Can we identify heuristics in participants’ decision processes? 
• Can we link the deviations from rationality to known biases? 
• Can we influence participants’ decisions? 
 
These questions shape a very ambitious program, of which this paper is an exploratory 
early stage that aims at gaining a better understanding of the problem, but does not provide 
generalizable results. I consider this topic important because of the combination of three factors. 
Firstly, offshoring decisions are strategic and carry very high stakes for a company. Secondly, 
the use of heuristics is widespread. We use heuristics intuitively in daily routines, but we also 
use them in strategic decisions to help us cope with uncertainty, time pressure, overflow of 
information and lack of structure (Simon, 1979; Schwenk, 1984; Busenitz & Barney, 1997), 
regardless of our personality traits (Baron, 1998; Forbes 2005; Simon, Houghton & Aquino, 
2000). Finally, current results of offshoring are subpar. Larsen, Manning and Pedersen (2012) 




I argue that this combination of factors creates a large and valuable potential for 
improvement if managers become more aware of their decision processes, limits, shortcuts, 
potential traps and inherently bounded rationality. Given the ubiquitous nature of biases, tools 
such as simulations games and new teaching methods could be useful for a large array of people. 
I envision this research project as a back and forth between laboratory trials and theory 
building, in which initial trials will inform theory and the improvement in theoretical models 
will allow for better targeted and better controlled experiments. This trial represents the first 
step in exploring the presence of biases in this offshoring decision, and I focus the investigation 
around three hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1: Under conditions that are objectively favorable to local production, some 
offshoring will still occur, indicating existence of offshoring bias, consistent with Grey 
et al. (2017). 
• Hypothesis 2: When contextual conditions change such that offshoring goes from 
economically unfavored to less unfavored, participants’ degree of offshoring will vary 
uncorrelated with the new economically rational option. 


















2.2) Trial Description and Methodology 
2.2.1) Trial Design 
I developed a simulation in the form of a web application, giving participants the role of the top 
manager of an electronic components company. In the initial situation, the company produces 
components in-house in the region where they are sold. The simulation lasts for 12 simulated 
“months” representing periods of production and sales. At each of these 12 periods, participants 
have the choice to maintain local production, or to offshore it, the latter being irreversible. 
The offshore supplier offers a cheaper cost per unit ratio, if the participant successfully 
computes and compares the cost of production per unit and the cost per worker.  
However, following the Cost Differential Frontier framework, ordering offshore instead 
of producing locally increases lead-time and therefore introduces uncertainty in the demand for 
each period, unlike local production that is considered to be made on-demand. 
The balance between the costs and the volatility of demand – which evolves during the 
simulation – defines the optimal solution according to the Cost Differential Frontier model. 
The simulation includes three parts: 
• Briefing screen and demographic information form (age, occupation, country). 
• The task itself with 12 periods. 
• A feedback form with 5 questions:  
▪ Were your decisions based on analysis and calculations? (Yes / Somewhat / 
No).  
▪ Are you convinced you made the right decisions? (Yes / No).  
▪ What were the factors guiding your decisions? (Economic / Social / Both).  
▪ Which production option do you think was the most profitable? (Always 
Local / Always Offshore / Offshore after month 7 / Balanced).  
▪ How would you describe your general risk profile in life? (Risk Seeker / Risk 
Neutral / Risk Averse).  
▪ And an Open-comment field. 
 











Figure 2.2: The simulation interface during the task. 
 
 
During the task, as shown in figure 2.2 the screen has three elements: 
• A board displaying economic information, demand data, and past month results. 
• The decisions buttons the participant uses to enter choices, with four possible actions: 
hire a worker, fire a worker, proceed to next period, offshore production.  
• A textbox displaying basic advice, occasional prompting from virtual shareholders 





Figure 2.3: The simulation interface on the final feedback questionnaire screen. 
 
To simplify the task so the participants focus on the decisions I study, no hiring or firing cost 
is incurred. Managing local production is therefore as easy as adapting workforce to current 
demand, whereas offshoring requires placing orders before knowing demand which places the 
participant in front of a Newsvendor problem. 
Using the Cost Differential Frontier tool, the volatility of demand and the costs of 
production can be set to a point of financial equilibrium, where a rational decision-maker would 
be indifferent between producing locally, at a slightly higher cost, and offshoring, incurring 




Here is how it can be done following the model from de Treville, Cattani and Saarinen (2017): 
We model the demand as following a lognormal distribution. 
We set a selling price of 130$ and a median demand of 110 units. 
With a volatility of 0.7 (fast-moving product), average demand is 141 units/period. 
If we set the offshore production cost at 90$/unit, following the Newsvendor model: 
- The cost of underage (being one unit short in inventory and therefore missing one sale) is 40$. 
- The cost of overage (having one unsold unit left in inventory at the end of the period) is 90$. 
- The Service Level is  
Cost of Underage





The optimal order quantity under uncertainty (offshore) in standard deviations is -0.502. 
In terms of units, the optimal order quantity is 110 * EXP(-0.502 * 0.7) = 77.4 units. 
The fill rate is estimated at 0.5. 
Expected sales are 69.7 units, which gives an expected revenue of 69.7 * 130 = 9061$. 
Expected leftovers are 7.7 units. 
Expected offshore costs are 77.4 * 90 = 6966$. 
We do not value nor penalize the remaining stock, considering that a fast-moving electronic 
product will not be sellable on the next period, but will be easily disposable.  
Expected profit is therefore 9061 - 6966 = 2095$. 
Locally, with same price and expected demand, expected profit = 141 * (130 - local cost). 
To balance expected local and offshore profits, the local cost should therefore be set to 115$. 
Selling price (130$) and median demand (110) will stay fixed in the simulation. 
The local cost will also be fixed, at 105$, which creates: 
• Condition A: very favorable to local (expected profit = 3513$ vs 2095$ offshore). 
By adjusting the volatility and the offshore cost, conditions can be changed to: 
• Condition B: volatility lowered to 0.6 which gives a mean demand of 132, and offshore 
cost lowered to 85$; still favorable to local (expected profit = 3300$ vs 2734$ offshore). 
• Condition C: volatility lowered to 0.5 which gives a mean demand of 125, and offshore 
cost lowered to 80$; favorable to offshore (expected profit = 3464$ vs 3125$ local). 
Participants are randomly assigned one of two scenarios. Both scenarios start in condition A, 
where producing locally is significantly better than offshoring. Then a change occurs at period 
7. The idea is to manipulate decision environment variables and observe results in terms of 
variation in the decisions and outcomes.  In scenario 1, simulation switches to condition B. In 
scenario 2, simulation switches to condition C. Participants are warned about the change by an 





• Scenario 1: very favorable to local at first, then less but still favorable to local.  
• Scenario 2: very favorable to local at first, then favorable to offshore. 
2.2.2) Procedure 
Kahneman (2003) argues that in the context of heuristics and biases studies, within-participant 
designs attract participants’ attention to the variables that are manipulated in different 
conditions and encourage them to adopt artificially consistent strategies. I opted for a between-
participants methodology, with each participant being randomly assigned one of the two 
scenarios, and participating only once. Participants were not limited in their decision time. 
Average duration of the simulation was 22 minutes. As pointed out by Karahanna et al. (2018), 
online experiment without supervision risks losing internal validity. I limited this mode of 
administration to participants I really could not meet physically, representing only 8 out of 100, 
and therefore I had the opportunity to talk informally with some participants after their sessions.  
Lonati et al. (2018) provide a useful set of good practices regarding experimental design 
in behavioral operations management research. Demand effects are one of the main pitfalls, 
with subjects reacting to cues about what constitutes the expected or desirable behavior instead 
of acting as they would in a natural setting. 
Regarding experimenter and context influence, the random assignment of scenario to 
each participant is built in the software and as the experimenter, I was not aware of which 
scenario was being played. Participants were not aware of other treatments and my interactions 
with them were limited to making sure the instructions were clear. 
I did not choose to create a fully “abstract frame” (Donohue, Katok & Leider, 2018, p. 
15) for the task, and instead provided a clear context around the offshoring decision. Given the 
essence of such a decision, social desirability definitely plays a role in the decision process, but 
it is also a core element of a real-life offshoring, and is therefore suitable to reproduce the 
relevant mindset and activate in participants the same thought process they would use in 
practice. However, I made the instructions formulation (figure 2.1) as neutral as possible 
regarding the criteria of what a good decision would be. I voluntarily stated the goal for 
participants as “make your company thrive,” with the intention to give them free interpretation 
of what “thrive” meant – profit, employment, demand satisfaction, sustainability... 
All participants – across scenarios – had the same level of potential awareness of what 




Another risk pointed out by Lonati et al. (2018, p. 21) is “incorrectly specified 
comparisons between two levels of the same independent variable,” in the context of this trial, 
that would be comparing a group that experiences a sudden change in parameters with a group 
that keeps the same parameters all along, or two changes in parameters in opposite direction. 
In order to avoid that issue, the trial is designed such as both groups experience a change 
in parameters in the same direction – both make offshoring more favorable than in the initial 
condition – scenario 1 being the “baseline treatment” and scenario 2 the “comparison treatment” 
(Donohue, Katok & Leider, 2018, p. 13). 
The authors also warn against the lack of consequential decisions and outcomes and 
suggest that a compensation based on performance is a good practice. However, I opted against 
this option – and provided a fixed compensation for participation – in order to avoid having to 
disclose a clear performance indicator to participants, which would have led to strong demand 
effects. For example, linking participants’ compensation to in-game final profit would have 
made it the de-facto goal of the game, eliminating potential alternative goals such as local 
employment, goods transportation minimization, mismatch minimization. As previously 
discussed, the purpose of my design was to leave this aspect to each participant's appreciation. 
2.2.3) Participants 
The random assignment process – built-in the software using the Math.random() JavaScript 
function – led to a total of 48 participants in scenario 1 and 52 participants in scenario 2, which 
is in line with the unformal standard or 50 participants per treatment (Lonati et al., 2018). 
I tried to avoid the usual “western sophomore science” bias by varying participants’ profiles, 








Figure 2.4: Participants description. I started my study at the University of Lausanne, where the main 
demographics are Swiss and French students. Out of my 100 participants, 58 are European resident 
students, with 46 of them studying Business or Economics, and 12 studying other fields. Through word 
of mouth, I met 3 professionals in the field of management in Switzerland and 2 international 
academics. I used the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform to reach 8 more professionals, 7 of them 
from the U.S., in the field of supply-chain or operations at large. Finally, I administered the 
simulation in the Philippines with 17 workers in various fields and 12 students, 11 of them studying 
Business or Economics. 
2.2.4) Data Analysis 
I performed three checks to make sure participants understood the task, so their choices 
reflect decisions and not misunderstandings: 
1) I ran pretests of the trial to improve clarity of interface and wording. These pretests 
were conducted as three sessions of the simulation with one or two volunteer students – for a 
total of five pretesters – unaware of the research topic, who agreed to give feedback on any 
misunderstanding about the task, as well as their step by step thinking process. A representative 
example of the improvements made through pretesting was changing the labels of what I 
initially called “demand periods” without any more specification, which consistently confused 
testers, who inquired if it referred to days, months or years. This detail does not make a 
difference in the model but as testers seemed put off by this designation, I settled label them 
months, and none of the subsequent participants in the trial raised any question about time 
frames.   
2) During the simulation, after reading the briefing but before starting to make decisions, 
each participant had to take a short quiz, have it validated and, if necessary, corrected before 




irreversible, demand was not correlated between months, and local production was more 
expensive than offshore when adding fixed and variable costs. The quiz is shown in figure 2.5. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: The quiz used after reading the briefing screen but before starting the task, to make sure 
participants have understood the instructions. 
 
3)  During data treatment, I created a binary variable called “Understood” that was 
meant to determine if each participant had correctly understood the task of if the decisions 
suggested unusually misguided – or random – decisions. When local, producing more than 20% 
over or less than 20% under the displayed demand was considered a mistake. When offshore, 
ordering more than 400% of the median or less than 25% of the median was considered a 
mistake. More than three mistakes gave a 0 score. 93% of participants had a positive 
understanding score. I decided not to include this variable in the analysis after reading 
comments and discussing with participants who deliberately placed orders that would be 
flagged as misunderstandings. For example, a participant in the Philippines whose family runs 
a village convenience store, explained that she preferred selling a very small amount of goods 
every period with the certainty of a small profit, over having to manage more goods or risk any 
overstock. I did not remove these participants from the data for the same reason, and because it 
is probable some real-life offshoring decisions are taken without perfect understanding of the 





Each time a participant completed the simulation, raw data – that was already anonymized and 
only identified by a numerical code that the participant noted and presented to receive payment 
– was automatically sent via email to my server in the format showed in figure 2.6. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Raw data from a participant. Raw data include the initial demographic questions, the 
scenario experienced, the details of the parameters and decisions for each month of the simulation - 
including the demand, production decisions, sales, financial results and whether the participant has 
offshored or not - and the answers to the feedback questions. 
 
The idea was to present raw data in a format that was readable for the experimenter so 
it would be immediately usable, for example to be discussed in an unformal way with the 
participant when time permitted. After all the laboratory sessions were completed, the data was 






2.3.1) Decision Profiles 
In scenario 1, the economically optimal strategy to never offshore was adopted by 14 
participants out of 48 (29%). In scenario 2, where the economically optimal strategy was to 
offshore after the switch of conditions at month 7, I considered any offshoring happening 
between month 7 and 12 as an adoption of the optimal strategy, and observe it for 22 participants 
out of 52 (42%). The rationale for this wider definition of optimal strategy is that being able to 
consider the feedback from degraded conditions – after having missed the earliest opportunity 
to offshore – to change course of actions is a well guided behavior. A stricter definition – only 
month 7 for example – does not change the sense of subsequent results. Across both scenarios, 
only 36% of participants adopted the economically optimal strategy. 
Based on the scenario experienced and the month at which each participant decided to 
offshore, I defined four decision profiles: 
1. The “Offshore anyway” profile applies to participants in any scenario who offshored 
sometime during the first six months of the simulation. The name refers to the idea that 
they offshored despite the economic conditions being very favorable to local 
production. 
2. The “Easily triggered” profile applies to participants of scenario 1 who offshored 
sometime after the change of economic conditions on month 7. The name refers to the 
idea that their offshoring follows a switch in economic conditions that is not sufficient 
to make offshoring economically optimal. 
3. The “Optimal strategy” profile applies to participants in scenario 1 who never offshored 
or to participants in scenario 2 who offshored sometime after the change of economic 
conditions on month 7. The name refers to the idea that their strategy matches the 
economically optimal choice. 
4. The “Never offshore” profile applies to participants in scenario 2 who never offshored. 
The name refers to the idea that they do not offshore even when economic conditions 
become favorable to offshoring. 
 
A classification algorithm, applied to each participant, would be: 
IF(Offshoring_time < Month07)        {Profile=1;} 
ELSE IF(Scenario==1 AND Offshoring_time <= Month12)       {Profile=2;} 
ELSE IF((Scenario==1 AND Offshoring_time == NEVER) OR (Scenario==2 AND Offshoring_time <= Month12)) {Profile=3;} 




Note that I detailed the conditions for profile 4 but I could have used a simple ELSE 
condition as the four profiles cover all possible strategies adopted in the simulation. They are 
also mutually exclusive. 
Figure 2.7 shows, for each scenario, the number of participants who offshored at each 
given month. It indicates the number of new offshorings each month, and not the cumulative 
number of participants having offshored at each point. As offshoring is irreversible in the 
simulation, each participant is counted once in the figure and belongs to only one decision 
profile. The decision profiles are represented by colors: red for profile 1, yellow for profile 2, 
green for profile 3, blue for profile 4. 
For example, in scenario 1, nine participants offshored on month 7, and they belong to 
profile 2 “Easily triggered”. Another example, in scenario 2, three participants offshored on 
month 3, and they belong to profile 1 “Offshore anyway”. The sum of the table is 100 as there 
are 100 participants in the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Number of participants who offshored each month in each scenario. In red, offshoring 
decisions taken despite conditions very unfavorable to offshoring. In yellow, offshoring decisions 
taken despite conditions slightly unfavorable to offshoring. In green, offshoring decisions taken when 
conditions were favorable to offshoring. In blue, no offshoring decision despite conditions favorable to 
offshoring. Offshoring is irreversible, each participant can only offshore once, or never. 
 
Figure 2.8 shows the number of participants belonging to each decision profile. 
 
 




For each profile, I propose an interpretation and suggest heuristics that could potentially 
explain the strategy adopted by the participants. This associative interpretation of data should 
be taken as a motivation for follow-up experimental tests, based on formal model of the 
heuristics and the behavior we could expect if they are indeed at play. 
1. The “Offshore anyway” profile. In both scenarios, around 25% of participants (23% in 
S1; 27% in S2) offshored in the first six months, despite conditions being very favorable 
to local production. As calculated in chapter 2.2.1, the initial economic conditions 
(Condition A) offer an expected profit of 3513$ locally, versus an expected profit of 
only 2095$ offshore. From an economic point of view – assuming that participants wish 
to maximize their profit – this strategy would be a mistake, provoking a 40% cut in 
expected profit, and would signal a bias toward offshoring in the decision process. Gray 
et al. (2017) suggest the initial impulse of a decision-maker facing a complex and 
uncertain offshoring decision is to rely on an oversimplistic heuristic focused on finding 
the lowest cost per unit. The authors argue that this decision strategy can be seen as an 
instance of the Take-the-best heuristic (Gigerenzer et al., 1999), in which the 
alternatives are staying local or offshoring, and the cue considered as having the top 
validity is the landed cost per unit. Therefore, if the two alternatives differ in terms of 
unit costs, the search stops without going beyond this criterion and offshoring is selected 
without hidden costs being considered. If this is the case, the issue would be the use of 
this heuristic in a context in which it is not ecologically rational. Experience can help 
overcome this bias by increasing the ability to consider harder-to-quantify factors: the 
hidden costs (Moser, 2011), of which the supply/demand mismatch cost of my trial is a 
prominent example. 
2. The “Easily triggered” profile. Unsurprisingly, since that is when conditions change, 
month 7 counts the highest number of offshoring decisions. This profile applies to 
scenario 1 participants who offshored after a change in conditions that was not important 
enough to make offshoring optimal. Long and Nasiry (2015) highlight the importance 
of reference points in prospect theory. In the present case, we have provided a clear 
reference point to participants with the initial conditions, and suddenly expose them to 
a condition where offshoring becomes more favorable than this reference. Overreaction 
is a well-known mistake in finance (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985), rooted in Kahneman 
and Tversky’s representativeness heuristic. People tend to overweight new information, 




insensitivity to base rate biases. Profile 2 participants self-identified as more risk-neutral 
than other profiles, had the longest average time spent on the simulation, and declared 
using slightly more calculations than others. They were looking for a clue, and when it 
came, they went for it even though it was delusive. 
3. The “Optimal strategy” profile, as previously defined for each scenario, was adopted by 
36% of participants, as they do not report using calculations more than other 
participants, subsequent investigations should be done to determine if these participants 
rely on specific cues, or on past experiences, or on a general intuition in their decisions. 
4. The “Never offshore” profile, applies to scenario 2 participants who never offshored 
even after it became optimal. Underreaction relies on a symmetrical mechanism to 
profile 2, a status-quo bias potentially fueled by risk-aversion. 
 
In this study, I do not make any assumption about the relative frequency of the four 
profiles. Instead, my claim is limited to the fact we see them all emerge, which suggests that 
the three types of deviations from the economically optimal strategy – as described for profiles 
1, 2, and 4 – exist across participants.  
Assuming that participants did not make decisions randomly, the existence of profile 1 
concurs with hypothesis 1 as it appears that some participants (25% of them) decided to offshore 
under economic conditions that are objectively favorable to local production. 
The existence of profiles 2 and 4 indicates that when contextual conditions change, 
participants' strategy do not always match the economically optimal option. Decisions in 
scenarios 1 and 2 need to be compared to investigate a possible support to hypothesis 2. 
2.3.2) Reaction to Economic Conditions Change 
A key result is the absence of significant correlation between the scenario experienced and the 
number of months spent offshore, as shown in figure 2.9. It appears that participants' offshoring 
decisions are not significantly different when offshoring becomes economically optimal in 
scenario 2 or when offshoring stays economically unfavorable in scenario 1, which gives 
support to hypothesis 2: participant's degree of offshoring vary uncorrelated with the new 
economically rational option when contextual conditions change. Participants do not appear to 







Figure 2.9: Impact of the scenario on the average number of months spent offshore. The 
degree of offshoring is not correlated with the scenario experienced. Even though conditions in 
scenario 1 would call for no offshoring at all, while conditions in scenario 2 would call for six months 
of offshoring, participants in both conditions spend in average around 4.2 months offshore. Error bars 
show standard error. 
 
A feedback question at the end of the task asked participants about the strategy they 
thought to be the most profitable. Comparing the answer with the scenario assigned, I define 
the FigureItOut binary variable: 1 for a correct match, 0 for a mistake. Only 44% of participants 
figured out the optimal strategy post-hoc, a weak improvement over the 36% who applied it 
during the simulation (DidItRight variable). A Chi-square test on the frequency of the right 
answer in each scenario does not reject the null hypothesis (χ2(1)=0.24, p=0.62 in scenario 1; 
χ2(1)=1.30, p=0.22 in scenario 2), confirming an absence of correlation between answers and 




2.3.3) Willingness to Pursue an Economically Optimal Strategy 
 
Figure 2.10: Impact of the strategy thought to be optimal on the average of months spent 
offshore. The offshoring decision that participants adopt appear to be correlated with the strategy that 
they identify as the most economically profitable. Error bars show standard error. 
 
It appears that participants did seek to pursue the economically optimal strategy. An analysis 
of variance shows that the number of months spent offshore significantly differs depending on 
which strategy the participant identifies as optimal, as shown in figure 2.10, and is strongly and 
significantly (p<0.01) correlated with each of the answers, except, “It was balanced.”  
Also, correlation between FigureItOut and the number of months offshored is negative 
in scenario 1 (r(46) = -0.28, p = 0.06), positive in scenario 2 (r(50) = 0.28, p = 0.04).  
FigureItOut and DidItRight are positively correlated (r(98) = 0.47, p<0.01), suggesting 
that participants’ choices are consistent with what they think is economically optimal. They 
wish to adopt the profit maximizing strategy when they can identify it, and divergent strategies 
appear to result from of a failure to do so rather than a wish to pursue another goal. These results 
give support to hypothesis 3: participants intend to adopt the economically rational option. 
When asked about the factors guiding their decisions, 53% of participants answered that 
it was based only on economic factors, 3% answered social factors only, and 44% both types 




2.3.4) Feedback Questions, Demographics and Performance 
Feedback questions show no difference in the use of calculations across profiles. Only one 
feedback question is moderately correlated with a profile: the self-assessed risk propensity, with 
risk seekers being more associated with “Always offshoring” profile 1 (p<0.05). The 
confidence in decisions is not significantly correlated with any profile but shows a remarkable 
trend as participants belonging to the “Optimal strategy” profile 3 express more confidence than 
profiles 1 and 2, but ironically not as much as participants belonging to “Never offshoring” 
profile 4, who display a higher but misguided confidence. 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Correlation table of decisions profiles and answers to feedback questions about 
participants’ risk profile, use of calculations and confidence in their strategy. 
 
As a measure of performance on the task, I computed a %MaxProfit variable, which 
captures the ratio of final realized profit compared to maximum potential profit, given each 
participant's demand data. As it is calculated for a local-only production, it can be slightly over 
1 with a successful offshoring. As expected, %MaxProfit is very significantly positively 
correlated with the Optimal strategy decision profile (r(98) = 0.35, p<0.01). 
The impact of demographics on performance is limited. Age does not have any 
significant impact. Academics performed better, but with a sample size too small (2 
participants) to draw conclusions, although it would be unsurprising that this group makes better 
educated guesses or calculations as they can recognize a familiar problem. Performance is lower 
in the South-East Asia group, but the decrease is only significant (p<0.01) for %MaxProfit. 
Possible explanations include a tendency for this group to include more social aspects in 
decisions (r(98) = 0.20, p=0.05), a greater reported risk seeking profile (r(98) = 0.26, p<0.01), 
and some cases of voluntary low production to assure a minimal profit. These factors lead to 





Figure 2.12: Impact of age on %MaxProfit, FigureItOut and DidItRight. 
 
 
Figure 2.13: Impact of origin on %MaxProfit, FigureItOut and DidItRight. With standard error bars. 
 
 




2.3.5) Post-Offshoring Decisions 
Focusing only on offshore orders decisions – made under demand uncertainty after participants 
decided to offshore – participants facing the Newsvendor problem seem to exhibit an anchoring 
bias toward the median demand given as 110. Only 2% of the orders were optimal, while 71% 
of orders were wrong in the direction of the given median. Figure 2.15 shows the mean order 
in each condition. But the factor that influences order decisions the most seem to be the demand 
experienced in the previous month. 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Summary of offshore orders, grouped by condition. 
 
Using the data from the participants who offshored, I could replicate part of the 
experiment from Schweitzer and Cachon (2000). The authors found that, “Overall, most 
decisions (64.3% or 594 decisions) were characterized by repeat choice. When subjects did 
change their order quantity across rounds, they were more than twice as likely to adjust their 
order quantity in the direction of prior demand (24.7% or 228 decisions) than away from it 
(11.0% or 102 decisions)” (p. 412).  
I analyzed the orders of participants who offshored for at least two months, excluding 
their first offshore order and their order on month 7 – since cost and volatility condition change. 
From my data, 56% of orders (184 decisions) were adjusted in the direction of prior demand, 
13% (41 decisions) away from it, and 31% (101 decisions) were repeat orders across rounds. 
These results indicate a “chasing demand” heuristic in participants decisions as they were more 










2.4) Limitations and Follow-up 
The scope of this exploratory trial is to introduce a new problem, that is more complex than the 
classic Newsvendor problem, as it adds an additional layer that requires the decision-maker to 
choose between two cost and demand volatility options. I observe the existence of decisions 
strategies that do not match the economically optimal options, and I suggest heuristics that 
could explain these strategies, but I do not claim to identify causality. 
Regarding internal validity, the main limitation of my study is that I do not propose a 
causal model to explain treatment effects, or alternative models based on different potential 
utility functions (Schweitzer & Cachon, 2000). This lack of “theoretical guidance” (Donohue, 
Katok & Leider, 2018, p. 6) means that I cannot infer causality between the treatments and the 
decisions, and do not provide generalizable outcome at this stage of the research. I also do not 
provide control for external factors that may intervene in this offshoring decision. Going 
further, it will be necessary, for example, to assess the potential learning effects that may 
emerge. The task was purposefully designed around a repeated decision – an alternative design 
with only 2 game months instead of 12, one in initial conditions and one after the parameters 
switch, was ruled out – as the exposure to demand volatility and mismatch is an important part 
of the real-life offshoring decision, but the consequences of this design should be assessed. 
I sought varied profiles for my participants in order to explore if age, origin or operations 
management skills – theoretical or practical – would yield differences in behavior, which indeed 
produced interestingly contrasted results between Western participants and South-East Asian 
participants that would deserve further investigation. However, this question was not my central 
in my research effort, and the sampling was not calibrated carefully enough. The resulting 
uneven sampling, and the fact that some subgroups are too small - especially Academics - might 
not have provided enough sensitivity to statistical tests. 
Regarding external validity, generalizability to environments outside the laboratory is 
not possible and not the ambition at this stage. As with any laboratory task, it is challenging to 
replicate the real-life decision environment, even more so with a decision as strategic as 
offshoring, that supposes huge stakes and involvement. In addition to the incentive question 
discussed in chapter 2.2, the task is purposefully oversimplified and asks participants – some 
with no relevant qualification – an immediate answer to a question that is usually debated and 
studied for months. 
In order to further develop research in this new problem space, the next step will be to 





I designed a software-based trial to explore decision-making processes in a complex supply-
chain problem. One hundred participants from various backgrounds faced an offshoring 
simulation requiring them to balance costs and demand uncertainty. In this setting, participants 
appeared to rely on heuristics that make them “non-hyper-rational actors in operational 
contexts” (Croson et al., 2012, p. 1), and 64% of them failed to adopt a mathematically optimal 
strategy, despite a wish to do so. Their suboptimal strategies might be the result of a misuse of 
heuristics. Notably, participants seemed to chase past demand values, focus on lower unit costs 
rather than a holistic evaluation of costs and risks, and take initial conditions as a reference 
point that can alter their reaction to the subsequent evolution of economic conditions. The 
results do not seem to be attributable to individual characteristics, reinforcing the idea that 
biases are ubiquitous, and adding to arguments for the potential value of decision-support and 
teaching tools such as simulations to increase decision-makers’ expertise via trial, errors and 
exploration of interactions, and consequences of different options. 
My contribution with this exploratory trial is the proposition of a new decision space for 
offshoring inspired by the Cost Differential Model (de Treville, Schuerhoff et al., 2014), in 
which the decision-maker has a choice between facing a Newsvendor problem to access lower 
unit costs, or pay a cost premium to eliminate demand uncertainty.  
Unlike a behavioral economist, I do not approach the problem with the intent to quantify 
biases impact and debiase the decision process. Instead, my goal is to make a diagnosis of the 
heuristics at play and how they operate, in order to inform the design of decision-tools. These 
tools, aimed at decisions makers – practitioners and students – should be designed to help them 
improve their analysis of information, enrich and calibrate their mental models better so the 
outcomes of their heuristics become more accurate. As proposed by Klein (2001), a bad 
decision is when we regret not only the outcome, but the process. 
This trial should be considered as a "pretheoretical work" in the sense of Hambrick 
(2007), that aims at reporting and documenting facts about an important phenomenon. It is even 
possible that unobserved covariates drive the relationship, but it does not invalidate the 
existence of the phenomenon, which at this point of the research, is enough to inform the design 





3) Biases in Offshoring Decision-Making: 
Exploration of Non-Economic Factors 
Influences 
3.1) Introduction 
The study of decision-making, long considered a pure cognitive application of mathematics, 
has evolved over the second half of the 20th century toward a behavioral approach that better 
describes the way human beings make choices. 
Herbert Simon introduced the concept of Bounded Rationality (1955, 1979), the idea 
that our mind does not possess the time and computational resources to solve problems to an 
optimum, contrary to what classic economy theories imply. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) investigated how decision-makers really think with their 
experiences on heuristics – rules of thumb that simplify decision-making – and biases. 
More recently, influential researchers like Gigerenzer (1999) and Klein (2001) 
demonstrated the power and general efficiency of heuristics, especially when they take 
advantage of the structure of information in the environment – what Gigerenzer calls ecological 
rationality – and when decision-makers develop expertise that allows them to match the right 
heuristic with the right problem. For Gigerenzer (1999) and Klein (2001), heuristics are 
efficient at satisficing, that is, reaching a good enough option, under time constraints and using 
a realistic amount of cognitive resources. 
These modern views of human decision-making have an important common premise: 
the decision-maker is no longer considered an isolated rational computer humanoid, but as a 
part of an environment, and their interaction with this environment is key to understanding both 
the outcome and the process of a decision. 
Despite their performance and usefulness, heuristics necessarily create biases – 
systematic deviations from rationality – even in the case of expert decision-makers and 
structured decision processes (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). 
As the bounded rationality of human decision-makers gains wider acceptance, biases 
are starting to be considered in the design of goods, services and infrastructures. Research 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) and practitioners show great interest in nudges to trigger certain 
behaviors in certain contexts, such as using the stairs instead of the elevator, reusing the towels 




been weaponized for less commendable purposes like dark patterns (Bösch et al., 2016) on 
websites and mobile applications to lure users away from information or into buying something. 
The heuristics and biases perspective applies to all types of decisions and has been 
abundantly studied in the context of managerial decision-making. 
The field of Operations Management offers a perfect example of a strategic decision in 
a complex environment: offshoring.  I focus my research on the economic offshoring decision, 
which can be summarized as the choice between continuing to produce locally – where the 
company sells its products – or move to a country with cheaper labor. This decision presents a 
difficult tradeoff between low unit costs and the increase in lead-time, and, therefore, in 
uncertainty about the demand. Recent studies (de Treville, Schuerhoff et al., 2014; de Treville, 
Bicer et al., 2014) have led to the development of a model that quantifies the increase of the 
cost of mismatch between production and demand as lead-time gets longer due to offshoring. 
The Cost Differential Frontier tool (http://cdf-oplab.unil.ch) gives a simple output of this model 
as a quantifiable value of shortening lead-time.  
Many other factors help shape an offshoring decision. Some  are economic or at least 
can tentatively be attributed an economic value: transportation risks and costs, communication 
complication, quality issues, intellectual property risks, loss of innovation capability, reputation 
risk (Schoenherr, Rao Tummala & Harrison 2008). 
Others can be classified as non-economic factors. Musteen (2016), through interviews 
with executives, identifies the influence of previous idiosyncratic experiences of the decision-
maker such as personal affinity with a country or culture of the industry, personal attitudes and 
emotions, with patriotism being prevalent, and cognitive limitations. The social externalities, 
widely absent from managerial decision models, are remarkably present in decision-makers 
thinking processes.  
I chose to focus my study on two non-economic factors that may influence offshoring 
decisions: peer influence, and the framing of the decision as a social choice. 
The underlying idea of peer influence is that when in doubt, in an uncertain situation, 
people tend to trust the decision of peers. As described by Asch (1951, 1955) in the majority 
influence experiments, the phenomenon appears even when the peers do not possess more 
complete information or any better insight or skills about the decision at hand, and the subject 
has no rational reason to think that others know better. In a managerial context, decisions can 
heavily rely on an industry-wide culture (Hahn, Doh & Bunyaratavej, 2009) and “common 




comparison between U.S.A. and Mexico because of “certainty of cost savings there” (p. 3444). 
The study by Petit and Bon (2010) suggests animal collective movements are not only the 
results of external factors – in our case, costs – but that peer behavior is also an input in the 
decision. They describe a distributed decision process, in which some individuals with 
information want to initiate a movement and communicate it to a limited number of peers. The 
movement can fail, or if the number of movers exceeds a certain threshold, bring away the 
whole group. In a managerial context, I suggest the offshoring movement in the last 30 years 
has followed the same pattern, with a critical mass being reached and fueling a self-reinforcing 
loop.  
The underlying idea of framing is that the same quantitative choice can lead to different 
preferences depending on what attributes are made cognitively available to the decision-maker. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) posit that, contrary to classic utilitarianism theories of rational 
choice, the invariance criterion can be violated depending on how a problem is described, or 
framed. The power of framing comes from the alteration of accessibility of information. By 
feeding the intuitive System 1 with oriented data, the structure of information can influence 
choices by playing on all three categories of heuristics identified by the authors: 
Representativeness, by answering a social question instead of an economic one; Availability, 
by filling the subconscious with ideas of ecology, social impact and patriotism; and Affect, by 
associating positive elements with local production. 
My goal is to explore the impact of these non-economic factors in an offshoring 
decision. I chose to approach the problem with a laboratory trial. I designed and coded a 
computer-based simulation that puts the participant in the role of a manager facing an offshoring 
decision.  
In a previous trial, I manipulated costs and demand volatility to create scenarios that 
could be optimally solved with the Cost Differential Frontier tool – not provided to participants 
– and compared the optimal strategy with participants’ choices. In this extension of the trial to 
non-economic factors, I will reuse these scenarios as a baseline, and add elements that simulate 
non-economic factors to assess their impact on the decisions. To simulate peer influence, I will 
let the participants think that most decision-makers in their situation decided to offshore. To 
frame the offshoring as a social one instead of a purely economic one, I will add elements 
evoking patriotism, such as the flag of a participant’s home country, on the interface and display 
messages emphasizing the positive employment and ecological impacts of the company in the 




I make three hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1: Participants’ decisions do not match mathematically rational options. 
• Hypothesis 2: We can observe an effect on participants’ decisions, when cueing them 
that most of their peers decided to offshore, that strengthens the offshoring tendency. 
• Hypothesis 3: We can observe an effect on participants’ decisions, when framing the 
decision as social instead of economical, that reduces the offshoring tendency. 
 
This study is an exploratory trial that do not provide generalizable results, but aims at 
increasing the understanding of the role of non-economic factors in offshoring decision-making 
and paving the way to tailored experiments to characterize their influence. 
My long-term goal in this research project is to identify the relevance of decision tools 
and design new tools to provide insights to practitioners, in line with the Hevner et al. (2004) 
concept of Information Systems as rooted in behavioral science and using design as a force to 
“extend the boundaries of human problem solving and organizational capabilities by providing 
intellectual as well as computational tools” (p. 76). On the model of what Osterwalder and 
Pigneur did for business modelling (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2013) with the Business Model 
Canvas, it should be possible to create artifacts aimed at practitioners that act both as checklists 
and ways to organize and give sense to the available information when making an offshoring 
decision, beyond the over-simplification of purely computational models. 
On the teaching and communication front too, tools and models that are informed by the 
true to life behavioral aspects of such decisions will bring much more added value to the 
knowledge transmission, and provide learners with insights that are applicable to work on the 
field. 
Decision tools that do not account for non-economic aspects are bound to be as limited 
in their helpfulness as they are limited in their ability to comprehensively integrate all relevant 
aspects of the decision-maker's thinking. Moreover, tools that are based on heuristics are easier 
to adopt in practice because they fit in the decision process that people already employ, they 
“pick up people where they stand” (Hafenbrädl et al., 2016, p. 3), they propose an incremental 
improvement instead of requiring a complete overhaul. 
The first step toward this goal is to identify the heuristics at play and the factors that 






3.2) Trial Description and Methodology 
3.2.1) Trial Design 
I developed a simulation in the form of a web application, giving participants the role of the top 
manager of an electronic components company. In the initial situation, the company produces 
components in-house in the region where they are sold. The simulation lasts for 12 simulated 
“months” representing periods of production and sales. At each of these 12 periods, participants 
have the choice to maintain local production, or to offshore it, the latter being irreversible. 
The offshore supplier offers a cheaper cost per unit ratio, if the participant successfully 
computes and compares the cost of production per unit and the cost per worker.  
However, following the Cost Differential Frontier framework, ordering offshore instead 
of producing locally increases lead-time and therefore introduces uncertainty in the demand for 
each period, unlike local production that is considered to be made on-demand. 
The balance between the costs and the volatility of demand – that evolves during the 
simulation – defines the optimal solution according to the Cost Differential Frontier model. 
The simulation includes three parts: 
• Briefing screen and demographic information form (age, occupation, country). 
• The task itself with 12 periods. 
• A feedback form with 5 questions:  
▪ Were your decisions based on analysis and calculations? (Yes / Somewhat / 
No).  
▪ Are you convinced you made the right decisions? (Yes / No).  
▪ What were the factors guiding your decisions? (Economic / Social / Both).  
▪ Which production option do you think was the most profitable? (Always 
Local / Always Offshore / Offshore after month 7 / Balanced).  
▪ How would you describe your general risk profile in life? (Risk Seeker / Risk 
Neutral / Risk Averse).  
▪ And an Open-comment field. 
 











Figure 3.2: The simulation interface during the task. 
 
 
During the task, as shown in figure 3.2 the screen has three elements: 
• A board displaying economic information, demand data, and past month results. 
• The decisions buttons the participant uses to enter choices, with four possible actions: 
hire a worker, fire a worker, proceed to next period, offshore production.  
• A textbox displaying basic advice, occasional prompting from virtual shareholders 





Figure 3.3: The simulation interface on the final feedback questionnaire screen. 
 
To simplify the task so the participants focus on the decisions I study, no hiring or firing cost 
is incurred. Managing local production is therefore as easy as adapting workforce to current 
demand, whereas offshoring requires placing orders before knowing demand, which places the 
participant in front of a Newsvendor problem. 
Using the Cost Differential Frontier tool, the volatility of demand and the costs of 
production can be set to a point of financial equilibrium, where a rational decision-maker would 
be indifferent between producing locally, at a slightly higher cost, and offshoring, incurring 




Here is how it can be done following the model from de Treville, Cattani and Saarinen (2017): 
We model the demand as following a lognormal distribution. 
We set a selling price of 130$ and a median demand of 110 units. 
With a volatility of 0.7 (fast-moving product), average demand is 141 units/period. 
If we set the offshore production cost at 90$/unit, following the Newsvendor model: 
- The cost of underage (being one unit short in inventory and therefore missing one sale) is 40$. 
- The cost of overage (having one unsold unit left in inventory at the end of the period) is 90$. 
- The Service Level is  
Cost of Underage





The optimal order quantity under uncertainty (offshore) in standard deviations is -0.502. 
In terms of units, the optimal order quantity is 110 * EXP(-0.502 * 0.7) = 77.4 units. 
The fill rate is estimated at 0.5. 
Expected sales are 69.7 units, which gives an expected revenue of 69.7 * 130 = 9061$. 
Expected leftovers are 7.7 units. 
Expected offshore costs are 77.4 * 90 = 6966$. 
We do not value nor penalize the remaining stock, considering that a fast-moving electronic 
product will not be sellable on the next period, but will be easily disposable.  
Expected profit is therefore 9061 - 6966 = 2095$. 
Locally, with same price and expected demand, expected profit = 141 * (130 - local cost). 
To balance expected local and offshore profits, the local cost should therefore be set to 115$. 
Selling price (130$) and median demand (110) will stay fixed in the simulation. 
The local cost will also be fixed, at 105$, which creates: 
• Condition A: very favorable to local (expected profit = 3513$ vs 2095$ offshore). 
By adjusting the volatility and the offshore cost, conditions can be changed to: 
• Condition B: volatility lowered to 0.6 which gives a mean demand of 132, and offshore 
cost lowered to 85$; still favorable to local (expected profit = 3300$ vs 2734$ offshore). 
• Condition C: volatility lowered to 0.5 which gives a mean demand of 125, and offshore 
cost lowered to 80$; favorable to offshore (expected profit = 3464$ vs 3125$ local). 
 
Participants are randomly assigned to one of four scenarios. In all scenarios, participants 
start in condition A, where producing locally is significantly better than offshoring. Then a 
change in parameters occurs at period 7, leading to condition B or condition C depending on 
the scenario. Participants are warned about the change by an attention-catching message and 




Two scenarios, serving as control, are limited to these variations of economic variables.  
• In scenario 1, the simulation switches to condition B on month 7.  
• In scenario 2 the simulation switches to condition C on month 7.  
In two other scenarios, non-economic factors are added as treatments. 
• In scenario 3, beside the same switch as scenario 1, participants receive the 
notice that “80% of players in this configuration chose to offshore production” 
through the textbox on months 4 and 9. The goal is to test whether peer influence 
can increase the tendency to offshore. 
• In scenario 4, beside the same switch as scenario 2, the flag of the home country 
of the participant – asked at the briefing step – is displayed during the whole 
simulation, under the factory icon on the top left of the interface, right next to 
the number of workers. Additionally, messages about the positive social impact, 
“Your company just received an award for your positive impact on local social 
life and employment!” and ecological impact, “Your company is recognized as 
being eco-friendly! Your local production helps reduce CO2 emissions” are 
displayed through the textbox respectively on months 4 then 9, and 2 then 8, 
assuming the participant did not offshore before any of these points, in which 
case only the flag remains. The goal is to test for an impact of framing of the 
decision, to play on information accessibility and affect. Note that the non-
economic factors go against the economically rational decision of each scenario. 
 
 





Figure 3.5: Peer-influence message at the bottom of the interface screenshot. In scenario 3, this 
message appears during months 4 and 9. The appearance of a new icon and text in the textbox 
situated just under the decisions button is designed to attract participant's attention. 
 
Figure 3.6: Ecological and social messages at the bottom of the interface screenshots, and the flag of 
the participant's country in “Your Company” at the top left of the interface. In scenario 4, these 
messages appear respectively during months 2 then 8, and 4 then 9. The appearance of a new icon and 





• Scenario 1: very favorable to local at first, then less but still favorable to local.  
• Scenario 2: very favorable to local at first, then turns around to be favorable to 
offshore. 
• Scenario 3: like scenario 1, but participants receive the message about their peers 
deciding to offshore, on months 4 and 9. 
• Scenario 4: like scenario 2, but participants’ home country flag is displayed, and 
they receive messages about their positive social and ecological impact on 
months 2, 4 8 and 9, unless they already offshored. 
3.2.2) Procedure 
Kahneman (2003) argues that in the context of heuristics and biases studies, within-participant 
designs attract participants’ attention to the variables that are manipulated in different 
conditions, and encourage them to adopt artificially consistent strategies. I opted for a between-
participants methodology, with each participant being randomly assigned one of the two 
scenarios, and participating only once. Participants were not limited in their decision time. 
Average duration of the simulation was 21 minutes. As pointed out by Karahanna et al. (2018), 
online experiment without supervision is a risk of loss of internal validity. I limited this mode 
of administration to participants I really could not meet physically, representing only 16 out of 
200. Therefore, in addition to the open-comment field, I had the opportunity to discuss 
informally with some participants after sessions.  
Lonati et al. (2018) provide a useful set of good practices regarding experimental design 
in behavioral operations management research. Demand effects are one of the main pitfalls, 
with subjects reacting to cues about what constitutes the expected or desirable behavior instead 
of acting as they would in a natural setting. 
Regarding experimenter and context influence, the random assignment of scenario to 
each participant is built in the software and as the experimenter, I was not aware of which 
scenario was being played. Participants were not aware of other treatments and my interactions 
with them were limited to making sure the instructions were clear. 
I did not choose to create a fully “abstract frame” (Donohue, Katok & Leider, 2018, p. 
15) for the task, and instead provided a clear context around the offshoring decision. Given the 
essence of such a decision, social desirability definitely plays a role in the decision process, but 




relevant mindset and activate in participants the same thought process they would use in 
practice. However, I made the instructions formulation (figure 3.1) as neutral as possible 
regarding the criteria of what a good decision would be. I voluntarily stated the goal for 
participants as “make your company thrive,” with the intention to give them free interpretation 
of what “thrive” meant – profit, employment, demand satisfaction, sustainability... 
All the participants – across scenarios – had the same level of potential awareness of 
what the trial was about. I therefore argue that any possible demand effect was held constant. 
Another risk pointed out by Lonati et al. (2018, p. 21) is “incorrectly specified 
comparisons between two levels of the same independent variable,” in the context of this trial, 
that would be comparing a group that experiences a sudden change in parameters with a group 
that keeps the same parameters all along, or two changes in parameters in opposite direction. 
In order to avoid that issue, the trial is designed such as all groups experience a change 
in parameters in the same direction – all make offshoring more favorable than in the initial 
condition. Moreover, scenarios are designed as two pairs of identical economical parameters – 
scenario 1 and scenario 3, scenario 2 and scenario 4 – so that in each pair, the first scenario is 
the “baseline treatment” and the second scenario is the “comparison treatment” (Donohue, 
Katok & Leider, 2018, p. 13). 
The authors also warn against the lack of consequential decisions and outcomes and 
suggest that a compensation based on performance is a good practice. However, I opted against 
this option – and provided a fixed compensation for participation – in order to avoid having to 
disclose a clear performance indicator to participants, which would have led to strong demand 
effects. For example, linking participants’ compensation to in-game final profit would have 
made it the de-facto goal of the game, eliminating potential alternative goals such as local 
employment, goods transportation minimization, mismatch minimization. As previously 
discussed, the purpose of my design was to leave this aspect to each participant's appreciation. 
3.2.3) Participants 
The random assignment process – built-in the software using the Math.random() JavaScript 
function – led to a total of 48 participants in scenario 1, 52 participants in scenario 2, 52 
participants in scenario 3 and 48 participants in scenario 4, which is in line with the unformal 
standard or 50 participants per treatment (Lonati et al., 2018). I tried to avoid the usual “western 





Figure 3.7: Participants description. I started my study at the University of Lausanne, where 
the main demographics are Swiss and French students. Out of 200 participants, 122 are European 
resident students, 95 of them studying Business or Economics, and 27 studying other fields. Through 
word of mouth I got in contact with 7 professionals in the field of management in Switzerland and 5 
international Academics. I used the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform to reach 16 more professionals 
in the field of Supply-Chain or Operations at large, 15 of them from the US. Finally, I administered 
the simulation in the Philippines, with 27 workers in various fields and 23 students, 21 of them 
studying Business or Economics. 
 
This version of the trial is an extension of the one presented in chapter 2. Scenarios 1 
and 2 serve here as baseline respectively for scenarios 3 and 4. Therefore, I reuse the data from 
the 100 participants of the study presented in chapter 2, and add 100 new participants 
experiencing scenarios 3 and 4. As the laboratory sessions for two parts of the trial took place 
at the same time, participants were effectively assigned randomly to each of the four scenarios. 
3.2.4) Data Analysis 
I performed three checks to make sure participants understood the task, so their choices reflect 
decisions and not misunderstandings: 
1) I ran pretests of the trial to improve clarity of interface and wording. These pretests 
were conducted as three sessions of the simulation with one or two volunteer students – for a 
total of five pretesters – unaware of the research topic, who agreed to give feedback on any 
misunderstanding about the task, as well as their step by step thinking process. A representative 
example of the improvements made through pretesting was changing labels of what I initially 
called “demand periods”, which consistently confused testers, who inquired if it referred to 




put off by this designation, I settled label them months, and none of the subsequent participants 
in the trials raised any question about time frames.   
2) During the simulation, after reading the briefing but before starting to make decisions, 
each participant had to take a short quiz, have it validated and, if necessary, corrected before 
they could start. The questions checked that participants understood the offshoring decision was 
irreversible, demand was not correlated between months, and local production was more 
expensive than offshore when adding fixed and variable costs. The quiz is shown in figure 3.8 
 
Figure 3.8: The quiz used after reading the briefing screen but before starting the task, to make sure 
participants have understood the instructions. 
 
3) During data treatment, I created a binary variable called “Understood” that was meant 
to determine if each participant had correctly understood the task of if the decisions suggested 
unusually misguided – or random – decisions. When local, producing more than 20% over or 
less than 20% under the displayed demand was considered a mistake. When offshore, ordering 
more than 400% of the median or less than 25% of the median was considered a mistake. More 
than three mistakes gave a 0 score. 93% of participants had a positive understanding score. I 
decided not to include this variable in the analysis after reading comments and discussing with 
participants who deliberately placed orders that would be flagged as misunderstandings. For 
example, a participant in the Philippines whose family runs a village convenience store, 
explained that she preferred selling a very small amount of goods every period with the certainty 
of a small profit, over having to manage more goods or risk any overstock. I did not remove 
these participants from the data for the same reason and because it is probable some real-life 




Each time a participant completed the simulation, raw data – already anonymized and 
only identified by a numerical code that the participant noted and presented to receive payment 
– was automatically sent via email to my server in the format showed in figure 3.9. 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Raw data from a participant. Raw data include the initial demographic questions, the 
scenario experienced, the details of the parameters and decisions for each month of the simulation - 
including the demand, production decisions, sales, financial results and whether the participant has 
offshored or not - and the answers to the feedback questions. 
 
The idea was to present raw data in a format that was readable for the experimenter so 
it would be immediately usable, for example to be discussed in an unformal way with the 
participant when time permitted. After all the laboratory sessions were completed, the data was 






3.3.1) Overview of Offshoring Across Scenarios 
Figure 3.10 shows the average number of months spent offshore in each scenario, while figure 
3.11 shows the cumulative percentage of participants who offshored throughout the simulation. 
 
Figure 3.10: Impact of the scenario experienced on the number of months spent offshore. Error bars 
show standard error. 
 
 




As a reminder, the switch in parameters – offshore cost and demand volatility – in 
scenario 2 and 4 is important enough to make offshore the optimal solution from month 7 
onward, but scenario 4 frames the decision as a social choice in order to favor staying local 
while scenario 2 does not include any particular framing. In scenarios 1 and 3, the parameter 
switch is not important enough to make offshoring optimal, therefore participants should stay 
local, but scenario 3 hints that a large part of people in such situation did offshore while scenario 
1 does not try to influence.  
The number of participants – randomly – assigned to each scenario was balanced with 
48 for scenario 1, 52 for scenario 2, 52 for scenario 3 and 48 for scenario 4. The overall average 
of months spent offshore across all four scenarios is 4.37. The number of months spent offshore 
by the participants in each scenario, as presented in figure 3.10, indicates a deviation from 
optimality, as scenarios 1 and 3 would, in theory, call for no offshoring, while in scenarios 2 
and 4, optimal strategy would be 6 months of offshoring, giving initial support to hypothesis 1 
that expects a mismatch between participants decisions and mathematically optimal options. 
Instead, results show that participants in scenario 3 exhibit a higher number of months 
offshore (5.33), while participants in scenario 4 show a slightly lower number (3.67). In both 
scenario 3 and 4, the change in offshoring goes in the direction of the non-economic influence. 
The difference is statistically significant in scenario 3 (r(198) = 0.15, p<0.05), which is 
in line with hypothesis 2 that expects an effect of peer influence toward an increase of 
offshoring. The difference is not significant in scenario 4, giving no support to hypothesis 3 that 
expects a decrease in offshoring as a result of the social framing of the decision. 
3.3.2) Decision Profiles 
Based on the scenario experienced and the month at which each participant decided to offshore, 
I defined four decision profiles: 
1. The “Offshore anyway” profile applies to participants of any scenario who offshored 
sometime during the first six months of the simulation. The name refers to the idea that 
they offshored despite the economic conditions being very favorable to local 
production. 
2. The “Easily triggered” profile applies to participants of scenario 1 or 3 who offshored 
sometime after the change of economic conditions on month 7. The name refers to the 
idea that their offshoring followed a switch in economic conditions that was not 




3. The “Optimal strategy” profile applies to participants in scenario 1 or 3 who never 
offshored, or to participants in scenario 2 or 4 who offshored sometime after the change 
of economic conditions on month 7. The name refers to the idea that their strategy 
matches the economically optimal choice. 
4. The “Never offshore” profile applies to participants in scenario 2 or 4 who never 
offshored. The name refers to the idea that they did not offshore even when economic 
conditions became favorable to offshoring. 
 
A classification algorithm, applied to each participant, would be: 
IF(Offshoring_time < Month07)       {Profile=1;} 
ELSE IF((Scenario==1 OR Scenario==3) AND Offshoring_time <= Month12)  {Profile=2;} 
ELSE IF(((Scenario==1 OR Scenario==3) AND Offshoring_time == NEVER)  
     OR ((Scenario==2 OR Scneario==4) AND Offshoring_time <= Month12)) {Profile=3;} 
ELSE IF((Scenario==2 OR Scneario==4) AND Offshoring_time == Never)  {Profile=4;} 
 
Note that I detailed the conditions for profile 4 but I could have used a simple ELSE 
condition as the four profiles cover all possible strategies adopted in the simulation. They are 
also mutually exclusive. 
Figure 3.12 shows, for each scenario, the number of participants who offshored at each 
given month. It indicates the number of new offshoring each month, and not the cumulative 
number of participants producing offshore at each point. As offshoring is irreversible in the 
simulation, each participant is counted once in the figure and belongs to only one decision 
profile. The decision profiles are represented by colors: red for profile 1, yellow for profile 2, 
green for profile 3, blue for profile 4. For example, in scenario 3, seven participants offshored 
on month 6, and they belong to profile 1 “Offshore anyway”. Another example, in scenario 4, 
three participants offshored on month 8, and they belong to profile 3 “Optimal strategy”. The 
sum of the table is 200 since there are 200 participants in the experiment. 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Number of offshoring decisions each month in each scenario. In red, offshoring decisions 
taken despite conditions very unfavorable to offshoring. In yellow, offshoring decisions taken despite 
conditions slightly unfavorable to offshoring. In green, offshoring decisions taken when conditions 
were favorable to offshoring. In blue, no offshoring decision despite conditions favorable to 




Figure 3.13 shows the number of participants belonging to each decision profile. We 
can observe that all four profiles emerge, but I do not make claims about their relative frequency. 
 
 
Figure 3.13: Number of participants belonging to each decision profile. 
 
In scenario 1, the optimal strategy to never offshore was adopted by 14 participants out 
of 48 (29%). In scenario 3, with the optimal strategy being the same as in scenario 1 but with 
participants being told that their peers offshored, only 9 participants out of 52 (17%) adopted 
it. In scenario 2, where the optimal strategy was to offshore after the switch of conditions at 
month 7, I considered any offshoring happening between month 7 and 12 as an adoption of the 
optimal strategy, and observed it for 22 participants out of 52 (42%). In scenario 4, with the 
optimal strategy being the same as in scenario 2 but with participants being framed into 
considering the decision as social, 26 participants out of 48 (54%) adopted it. Across all 
scenarios, only 36% of participants adopted the optimal strategy, supporting hypothesis 1. 
3.3.3) Peer Influence Effect 
A Chi-square test (χ2(1)=7.008, p=0.008) shows that participants in scenario 3 were 
significantly more likely to offshore prematurely – during the first six months of the simulation 
when the conditions are very unfavorable to offshoring – than participants in scenarios 1 and 2. 
Note that taking both scenarios 1 and 2 as control here makes sense, as the first six months of 
the simulation are strictly identical for these three scenarios in terms of economic parameters, 
the only difference being the peer influence message. I excluded scenario 4 from this analysis 
as social framing messages appear during the first six months. Including scenario 4 would 






Figure 3.14: Chi-square test for “Offshore Anyway” behavior in scenario 3 vs scenarios 1 and 2. 
 
Focusing the comparison on scenario 1 and scenario 3, that share the same economic 
conditions, it appears that the peer influence messages displayed on months 4 and 9 are 
accompanied by a shift in participants’ behavior toward more offshoring.  
 
 
Figure 3.15: Repartition of participants among decision profiles in scenarios 1 and 3. Note that the 





A Chi-square test (χ2(1)=5.924, p=0.015) restricted to scenario 1 and 3 shows that  
participants in scenario 3 are significantly more likely to offshore in the first six months. As 
shown in figure 3.11 and 3.12, the increase in offshoring decisions is important in scenario 3 
on months 4, 5 and 6, right after the peer influence message is displayed. This observation 
gives support to hypothesis 2 regarding the existence of a peer influence associated with more 
offshoring. Differences in the later part of the simulation are not statistically significant. 
 
 
Figure 3.16: Chi-square test for “Offshore Anyway” behavior in scenario 3 vs scenario 1. 
 
3.3.4) Social Framing Effect 
Comparing scenarios 2 and 4, it appears that the social framing of the offshoring decision did 
not produce measurable effects. A slight decrease in offshoring during the first six months of 
the simulation can be observed, but no result is statistically significant.  
Moreover, on the feedback question about the main factor guiding their decision, 
participants who experienced scenario 4 did not select social factors any more than participants 
in other scenarios. Hypothesis 3 is not supported as we cannot observe a social framing effect. 
It is disappointing not to be able to reproduce the prevalent impact of social 
considerations seen in real life offshoring studies. It may be that framing elements in the task 
design are too light to provoke a shift of perspective for participants, or that it is difficult to 






Figure 3.17: Repartition of participants among decision profiles in scenarios 2 and 4. Note that the 
optimal strategy in scenarios 2 and 4 is offshoring on or after month 7. 
3.3.5) Open-Comments Analysis 
As mentioned in the trial description, the last question of the feedback part is a facultative open-
comment section. Out of 200 participants, 143 left a comment. I analyzed these comments with 
a methodology inspired by Musteen (2016) that consists in three steps: 
1. Guided by the research question, I developed an initial list of themes – costs, demand 
volatility, social aspects – to facilitate the exploration of the raw data. 
2. I conducted an in-depth within-participant analysis of each of the 143 comments, to tag 
them with one or several of the initial themes. The process was iterative, and the list of 
themes evolved as I noticed that some participants did not only comment about in-
simulation aspects, but also at a more meta level about the task and their personal 
feelings about it. I also realized that the level of complexity of the comment itself – 
number of themes mentioned – may have an interest. At this step I voluntarily took 
comments out of their context by obfuscating the related data about the participant 
demographics, offshoring decisions and scenario experienced. 
3. I switched to a cross-participants analysis to find patterns. At this step, I uncovered the 
context of each comment, including the scenario experienced by the participant who left 
each comment, and looked for potential in-group similarities and intergroup differences. 




Most comments focus on one aspect of the decision, notably costs: “As long as local 
costs were more expensive than foreign costs, I exported my production.” (Translated from 
French: “du moment que les coût locaux étaient plus chers que les coûts étrangers, j'ai exporté 
ma production”), demand uncertainty: “I think that the volatility was too high to take a risk of 
loosing money with offshoring”, or social responsibility: “I think a local production can help 
the economy of my country to increase. Whereas the off-shore will only help my own economy, 
but my reputation, my C02 print, will be bad”, and make no mention of the others.  
This monothematic nature of comments echoes what Das and Teng (1999) identify as 
“Prior hypotheses and focusing on limited targets,” a common bias in decision-making 
characterized by tendency of people to focus “on those key objectives that appeal to their 
interest,” ignoring other equally important parts of the big picture. Participants are put in a 
legitimate situation of innumeracy (Gigerenzer, 2003) given the complexity of the calculation 
and abundance of information. They need to simplify the task by substituting the complex 
instruction given in the introduction to “make your company thrive” by one component of 
success – ethics toward workers, or fulfillment of demand, or cheaper cost – and apply a Take-
the-best approach on this criterion of success.  
Two recurring themes are the expression of personal feelings about the decision process 
with such terms as “nervous,” “hesitant,” “safe,” and expression of regret, with hindsight, about 
the decision taken. 
In scenario 3 specifically, 38 participants out of 52 left a comment. Surprisingly, only 
one participant mentions the peer information message or peer influence in general: “I wanted 
to catch the market at the highs and make sure to not buy too many during the lows, but I 
couldn't seem to get that right, ever. I got the notice early in the game that most players offshore, 
but I wanted to keep using workers for the social aspect, but I succumbed to the temptation of 
more money.” Considering the importance of the effect and this apparent lack of identification, 
it would be interesting to conduct further tests on the level of awareness at which it operates.  
In scenario 4, 33 participants out of 48 left a comment. Contrary to scenario 3, it seems 
that participants are aware and willing to write openly about the influence they received from 
the messages. 11 participants clearly mention social aspects as part of their decision process. 3 
of them explicitly mention the simulated awards, for example: “I wanted to go offshore 
(because offshore productions became cheaper than they were before and volatility was reduced 
as well) towards the end but i kept getting rewards/achievements for employing people and 




more complex than in other scenarios, more frequently balancing the social and economic 
aspects, instead of focusing solely on one element: “My decisions were based on a desire to 
make a profit while keeping production local and avoiding the uncertainty of market volatility. 
Even if profit could have been maximized by going offshore, I felt more right by keeping it 
local.” Interestingly, 3 participants also mention social discomfort about staying local, 
specifically, having to hire and fire workers every month to adapt capacity to demand. They see 
offshoring as a way to free them from that unpleasant responsibility. One participant even 
mentions it as his main reason to offshore: “I was feeling uncomfortable to fire workers every 
months, that's why I decided to go offshore.. but was not the best decision ever, because then I 
had to satisfy stakeholders. I think stay in local production was the safe option.” 
3.3.6) Demographics and Performance 
In addition to the effect of non-economic factors, I used the extended set of data to redo 
calculations from my initial study on performance and demographics. 
Performance of the participants can be measured with three distinct benchmarks: 
• %MaxProfit: participant total profit compared to possible profit, given individual 
demand data, by staying local and always producing the right amount (successful 
offshoring can lead to values over 100%). 
• FigureItOut: comparison between the actual optimal strategy in the condition played, 
and the answer to the debrief question about what strategy the participant thought was 
optimal (binary variable set to 1 for a right answer). 
• DidItRight: consistency between the actual optimal strategy in the condition played, and 
the strategy adopted by the participant (binary variable set to 1 if participant offshored 
at the right time). 
 






Figure 3.18: Impact of Age on %MaxProfit, FigureItOut and DidItRight. 
 
Age, as presented in figure 3.18, has no statistically significant correlation with any of 
the performance indicators.  
 
 
Figure 3.19: Impact of Origin on %MaxProfit, FigureItOut and DidItRight. Bars show standard error. 
 
Participants from South-East Asia show lower overall performances than Western 
participants, as shown on figure 3.19, but only the %MaxProfit variable is significantly lower 
(r(198) = -0.28, p<0.01). As a possible explanation, feedback questions indicate that South-East 
Asian participants are less likely to take decisions on purely economic factors (r(198) = -0.19, 





Figure 3.20: Impact of Occupation on %MaxProfit, FigureItOut and DidItRight. Error bars show 
standard error. 
 
Regarding the Occupation variable, presented in figure 3.20, only the Academic profile 
is significantly associated with better performance (p<0.05 for %MaxProfit and DidItRight). 
The small number of Academic participants (5/200) precludes drawing conclusions, but it is 
not surprising that Academics in Operations are likely to make more accurate calculations or 
educated guesses in such a simulation presenting a familiar problem. 
It is interesting to make a parallel between performance and the number of months spent 
offshore in the simulation. As a reference point, a participant offshoring at month 7, when 
changes in parameters occur, spends 6 months offshore: months 7 to 12. 
 
 









Figure 3.23: Impact of Occupation on the number of months spent offshore. Error bars show standard 
error. 
 
Impact of age, origin, and occupation on the number of months spent offshore are 
presented respectively in figure 3.21, 3.22 and 3.23. Results appear to mirror performance 
benchmarks. As shown in figure 3.24, the number of months spent offshore across all scenarios 
is strongly negatively correlated (r(198) = -0.40, p<0.01) with the performance measured as 
%MaxProfit. The negative correlation between offshoring and performance suggests offshoring 
risk did not pay off on average, which can be explained by the greater difficulty of managing 
offshore production – having to bet on demand – and the fact that negative consequences from 





Figure 3.24: Impact of the number of months spent offshore on the profit performance. 
 
As shown in figure 3.25, demographics – age, origin, occupation – are not correlated 
with the profiles, except for the aforementioned overperformance of the Academics, that 
translates into a moderate correlation between this occupation and profile 3 “Optimal strategy”. 
 
 
Figure 3.25: Correlation matrix focused on profiles and demographics. Profiles are not correlated 








3.3.7) Willingness to Pursue an Economically Optimal Strategy 
 
 
Figure 3.26: Impact of the option thought to be rational on the number of months spent offshore. 
Error bars show standard error. 
 
 
Figure 3.27: An ANOVA shows that the number of months spent offshore is statistically different 






Finally, there is a correlation between the decisions of participants and the strategy they 
identify as economically optimal. As shown in figure 3.26 and the accompanying ANOVA in 
figure 3.27, the degree of offshoring thought to be the most profitable is correlated with the 
number of months effectively offshored (p<0.05 for “Always Local” and “Always Offshore”, 
p<0.1 for “Local first, Offshore after 7”, not significant for “It was Balanced”). It must be noted 
that the question about the optimal strategy was asked after completion of the simulation, and 
could therefore be informed by the experience of the participant and does not permit to assume 
causality.  
When asked, also at the end of the simulation, if they felt convinced that they took the 
right decision, 52% of participant answered yes, with little difference between scenarios (52% 
in scenario 1, 58% in scenario 2, 46% in scenario 3 and 50% in scenario 4). There is no 
correlation between this confidence indicator and and FigureItOut or DidItRight.  
Also, there is no correlation between the scenario experienced and the strategy identified 
as economically optimal. However, there is a strong significant correlation (r(198) = 0.35, 
p<0.01) between FigureItOut and DidItRight, confirming the results of my previous study that 
participants adopt the strategy they identify as economically optimal, and suggesting that 


















3.4) Limitations and Follow-up 
The scope of this exploratory trial is to introduce a new and more complex problem than the 
classic Newsvendor, as it adds an additional layer that requires the decision-maker to choose 
between two cost and demand volatility options. I observe decisions patterns suggesting that 
participants use heuristics in ways that drive their choices away from the mathematically 
optimal option, but I do not claim to identify causality or assess magnitude of these effects. 
In addition to the limitations mentioned in chapter 2.4 – lack of causal model and 
controls – I used no manipulation check to make sure the social framing produced the intended 
effect on participants. My confidence toward the efficiency of the cues was limited to self-
report of a limited number of pretesters of the simulation. If we use the feedback question about 
decision factors – What were the factors guiding your decisions? Economic / Social / Both – as 
a manipulation check, we can suspect that social framing was not achieved, as participants in 
scenario 4 do not declare basing their decisions significantly more on social factors than 
participants in other scenarios. A different framing protocol, possibly using more immersive 
elements like images, videos or virtual reality settings could be considered. 
Some participants even see offshoring as a way to avoid the social burden of firing 
people, a reversal of my intention which was to contrast the positive social impact of local jobs 
with getting rid of all internal workers to subcontract in a foreign country. This behavior might 
be an artifact of the simulation design, which – except for scenario 4 treatment – is voluntarily 
minimalistic in its definition of offshoring and its social consequences. 
The briefing mentions “At any moment, you can take the decision to offshore your 
production. It will fire all your workers, and let you buy from a supplier instead of producing 
locally. You will benefit from lower costs but will not anymore know the demand before 
producing, only general statistics” but the emphasis in the task is on the latter part, the demand 
uncertainty increase and cost decrease. Consideration of social impact is left to the discretion 
of participants and their own opinions, and does not have consequences in the simulation. 
An option would be to create a richer context around the task, a mini case that would 
present the pros and cons of the offshoring option in more details, including the firing of local 
workers. The use of virtual reality would make it even more powerful. However, enriching the 
context increases the risk of creating demand effects or involuntary framing of the decision. 
Another option would be to ensure the full understanding of the social stakes via pretesting 




A third option would be to control for it in the task, which could be achieved via a 
change in simulation design that would require participants to think aloud, verbalize all of their 
thinking process that would be recorded and analyzed in parallel with their decisions. This 
methodology is particularly interesting as it would not only inform about the social aspects 
understanding, but also give deeper insights into other elements of the decision-making process, 
showing how much attention participants give respectively to the costs differences, the demand 
volatility and the current financial results for example. An eye-tracking system could be 
informative to validate that treatment cues are noticed by all participants, and to determine 
which elements are considered before making a decision production, for how long, and in what 
order, which would also offer a more detailed outlook on the decision-making process. While 
the thinking aloud method could inform on the conscious thinking process, the eye-tracking 
might also reveal elements that are noticed but not consciously considered or at least not 
verbalized.  
Another aspect, on the technical side of the simulation, is the irreversibility of 
offshoring. In case of regret about not offshoring, a participant can always correct the “mistake” 
on the next month, whereas a participant who regrets offshoring cannot go back and will have 
to stay offshore until the end of the simulation. For example, a participant in scenario 4 who 
would offshore straight from month 1 and regret on month 2 when he sees the social message, 
could not undo his decision. The decision to make offshoring irreversible came from a need to 
keep the simulation as simple as possible and reflects the fact that real-life reshoring is difficult 
and costly, but its impact on the results should be assessed. 
I did not use a full factorial design, which would have meant dividing the participants 
into eight groups, four in each type of economic conditions with either peer influence, social 
framing, both treatments, or none of them. Instead, I designed the four scenarios so that three 
pairs of comparisons could be done: 
• Scenario 1 with scenario 2 (to assess the impact of two different economic conditions) 
• Scenario 1 with scenario 3 (peer influence in scenario 3 but same economic conditions) 
• Scenario 2 with scenario 4 (social framing in scenario 4 but same economic conditions) 
The first comparison is studied in chapter 2, the second and third are studied in this 
chapter. This design choice, in which non-economic factors go against the economically 
rational decision – peer influence happens in scenario 3 when offshoring is not actually the right 




factors – was made to put participants in front of conflicting decisions while simplifying the 
administration of the trial, keeping in mind that my ambition was to identify the existence of 
effects, but not to precisely measure their magnitude. 
For the same reason, the cues used in the non-economic factors scenarios (3 and 4) are 
not fully symmetrical: social framing involves two messages appearing at four different periods 
in the simulation as well as the country flag, while peer influence only involves one message 
appearing at two different periods in the simulation. 
The drawback is that effects of non-economic treatments cannot be disentangled from 
their respective economic context, and cannot be compared. The advantage is that groups are 
large enough – about 50 participants in each scenario, which was arguably a minimum as I also 
tried to explore the potential effects of some demographic factors – without having to recruit 
400 participants, which I did not have the resources to do. For subsequent experiments aimed 


















My contribution with this exploratory trial is the proposition of a new decision space for 
offshoring inspired by the Cost Differential Model (de Treville, Schuerhoff et al., 2014), in 
which the decision-maker has a choice between facing a Newsvendor problem to access lower 
unit costs, or pay a cost premium to eliminate demand uncertainty. In this setting, participants 
appear to rely on heuristics that make them “non-hyper-rational actors in operational contexts” 
(Croson et al., 2012, p. 1). 
Two hundred participants from various backgrounds faced a managerial decision-
making task around an offshoring case, based on the mismatch cost due to demand volatility 
increase with lead-time, and including treatments to assess influence of non-economic factors. 
Participants generally fail to identify the mathematically optimal strategy, despite an 
apparent wish to apply it, which suggests potential value for decision-tools allowing trial and 
error. The low impact of demographics shows ubiquity of similar biases and underlines the 
broad interest of such tools. 
Peer influence can be simulated, and subsequent effects can be detected; in this 
simulation, a simple message indicating most peers in the same situation decided to offshore 
increases the likelihood that participants receiving it will themselves offshore.  
However, the well documented effects of social factors and framing of the decision, 
which can reverse preferences by altering the accessibility of information, have failed to be 
reproduced well enough in my simulation to have an impact on the decisions, even if it seems 
to be noticeable in the thinking process of some participants.  
Unlike a behavioral economist, I do not approach the problem with the intent to quantify 
biases impact and debiase the decision process. Instead, I wish to continue developing similar 
simulations to capture more insights about the offshoring decision process and ultimately 
provide decision-makers with tools and processes to increase the quality of their mental models, 
calibrate their heuristics better and make well-informed choices. 
This trial should be considered as a “pretheoretical work” in the sense of Hambrick 
(2007), that aims at reporting and documenting facts about an important phenomenon. It lacks 
an explicit causal model at this stage, and it is even possible that unobserved covariates drive 
the relationship, but it does not invalidate the existence of the phenomenon, which at this point 




4) Lead-Time Manager: Development of an 
Operations Management Simulation-Game 
4.1) Games, Simulations, Serious games and Simulation-Games  
The dictionary definition (Flexner, 1970) of a game is “a competitive activity involving skill, 
chance, or endurance, played by two or more persons according to a set of rules, usually for 
their own amusement or for that of spectators.” Playing games involves problem solving in the 
sense of Simon (1996) as summarized by Hevner et al. (2004, p. 88): “Utilizing available means 
to reach desired ends while satisfying laws existing in the environment.” Game-playing is a 
fundamental human activity in early stages of development that helps us acquire skills. 
A lack of consensus exists in the literature – not to mention in practice – about the 
appropriate use of the terms “game,” “simulation,” and “serious games.” Sauvé et al. (2007) 
argue this blur is a source of discrepancy in the evaluation of artifacts and their efficiency. They 
formalize a definition of games by identifying their attributes: player(s), a conflict or 
cooperation dynamic, rules, a goal, an artificial nature, and, if the game is to be educational, a 
pedagogical aspect. On the other hand, simulations are models of reality defined as systems. 
They must be dynamic, simplified as compared to reality – although it frequently startles 
practitioners – but accurate and valid, and if the simulation is to be educational, include learning 
objectives. Games include a winning process and follow their own artificial rules. Simulations 
do not imply a competitive aim, not even necessarily user interaction – think of a solar system 
simulation – and their rules mimic those of a real, natural phenomenon.  
Two visions exist regarding what qualifies a game as serious. Abt (1970, p. 9) argues 
that serious games “have an explicit and carefully thought-out educational purpose and are not 
intended to be played primarily for amusement.” Zyda (2005, p. 26) states that “pedagogy must, 
however, be subordinate to story – the entertainment component comes first.” Despite 
disagreement about the prevalence of amusement or pedagogy, the authors agree serious games 
have an educational purpose, which goes beyond winning the game and transforms it into a 
medium for learning. Possible purposes include, but are not limited to: persuading, raising 
awareness, communicating. The work of Zyda (2005) is focused on video games. He is the 
author of America’s Army, the first large-scale serious game used by the U.S. Army as a 
recruitment and training tool. This is reflected in his definition of serious games as “a mental 




further government or corporate training, education, health, public policy, and strategic 
communication objectives” (p. 26), excluding offline forms like board games and role plays, 
which, ironically, were the first examples of military serious games. However, Zyda is correct 
that democratization of computers since the 1990s ignited an explosion in the development and 
use of serious games. Fueled by the availability of programming tools – and skills – for 
researchers and teachers, and a shift of mentality among digital natives about the meaning of 
playing, serious games and simulations developed in all fields, including supply-chain. An early 
and influential example is the Beer Distribution Game (Sterman, 1989) developed at MIT in 
the 1960s to illustrate the Bullwhip effect, which still inspires modern logistics collaborative 
games such as ColPMan (Mizuyama et al., 2016). 
Ellington (1981, p. 15) proposes defining a simulation-games as “exercises which have 
the basic characteristics of both games (competitions and rules) and simulations (ongoing 
representation of real life).” In my opinion, this definition applies to many modern artifacts, 
including my Lead-Time Manager, a game based on a real-life model, grounded in research, 
but including an entertaining aspect and a goal, even though the conflict is internal, with no 





















4.2) Our Operations Management Courses 
At the University of Lausanne, we use the Lead-Time Manager simulation-game in two 
different courses: A Bachelor-level introductory course in Operations Management, and a 
Master-level course in Supply-Chain Analytics. The Bachelor-level course covers a wide array 
of Operations topics like process analysis, bottlenecks, lot sizes, optimal order quantities and 
queuing theory. However, the most important topic of the semester is matching supply with 
demand. We start with demand volatility, geometric Brownian motion and the idea that demand 
information gets noisier as decision lead-time – the length of time between the moment at which 
the production decision is made and when demand is observed – increases. We instruct the 
students in use of the Newsvendor model, the concepts of service level and fill rate. This allows 
us to cover the calculation of mismatch costs under uncertainty, taking into consideration the 
risks of overstock and understock. Although some of the material is technically challenging 
(e.g., the assumption arising from a forecast-evolution process that follows a geometric 
Brownian motion that demand follows a lognormal distribution), the course material brings 
students to a high level of expertise in balancing mismatch losses. Optimal strategies for 
balancing over and under stocks are often counterintuitive: a high-cost producer may well turn 
out to be competitive when we consider the real options that are created when we reduce the 
decision lead-time. We use the Lead-Time Manager to help students get familiar with demand 
volatility as they experience various demand values for the two different products, and to make 
them face the dilemma of choosing between lower cost offshore production with unknown 
demand, and higher cost, local on-demand production.  
At the Master level, we build upon the technical knowledge and analyze case studies to 
challenge students to imagine supply-chain strategies that would give a competitive advantage 
to a company in a given industry. We analyze and classify the different types of products a 
company makes in terms of profitability and demand volatility. We encourage students to come 
up with “what-if” scenarios, reimagining the industrial organization. An example would be 
replacing a monolithic production line with versatile cells to allow more variety in production. 
The goal is to leverage a cut in lead-time, an increase in reactivity, to gain in competitiveness, 
create a servitizing or customizing activity around the product to add more value for customers, 
and make a local manufacturer, in a high-cost country, not only competitive but innovative and 
a leader in its industry. In recent years, there is increasing awareness of how manufacturing 




For these advanced users, the Lead-Time Manager can be understood in its full 
complexity and the challenge is to optimize the sourcing strategy by correctly balancing the 
portfolio of products that have different volatilities. Local capacity can be built to respond to 
the volatile demand of the high-margin product, which fully covers its costs. When demand for 
this product is low, the available capacity is not wasted thanks to a more standard product that 
can be made to stock if necessary, and that becomes profitable if you consider only its variable 
costs. Added bonuses are a maximal fill rate and a greener operation.  
The challenges posed by the material we teach can be summarized in three points: 
• Statistical reasoning: risk and rare events are difficult to grasp for the human brain. 
• Counterintuitiveness: students must overcome gut feelings and preconceptions. 
• Non-linearity: timing and interactions of decisions create divergent consequences.  
 
Traditional teaching might be enough to convey knowledge, but it fails to prepare 
students to apply this knowledge to real-life situations. We need tools for that, and simulation-




















4.3) Why is a Simulation-Game Adapted to this Teaching Case? 
The learning objective of the Lead-Time Manager is to switch players’ thinking on the 
offshoring problem. Instead of using a default – and misguided – “Lowest per-unit landed cost” 
heuristic and realize buffer with inventory, we wish to provide learners the intuition and 
demonstration that they can approach the situation as a capacity allocation problem and realize 
buffer with local capacity, which is a much more tractable problem and induces less detrimental 
biases. As mentioned in chapter 4.2, the obstacles are the difficulty of reasoning with statistical 
demand risk, the non-linearity of the lead-time effects, and the counterintuitiveness of the local 
production solution. 
Simulation-games can touch all three types of memories – visual, auditory, kinesthetic 
– and can be asynchronous and therefore self-paced for the learner. The games allow teachers 
to select events that can be rare in a natural setting, but give the learner the chance to gain 
experience and more importantly, expertise (Klein, 2001). 
The learning process in simulation-games can be approached through the Experiential 
Learning framework described by Kolb (2014), and its four phases: Experience, Process, 
Generalize and Apply. Ncube (2010, p. 568) notes that “games are especially relevant in the 
generalization and application phases by helping shift learner’s personal paradigms.” 
De-icing misconceptions is the first key to learning counterintuitive material. Van der 
Zee and Slomp (2009, p. 21) note that “[a long] time span is problematic for a clear 
understanding of cause and effect.” Simulation-games can clearly match an error with its 
consequence or a good decision with its reward, thanks to immediate feedback, replay and what-
if scenarios. It is key when teaching complex phenomena like statistical risks, and gives a sense 
of empowerment and competence to learners as they acquire skills.  
Simulation-games foster intrinsic motivation of the player as their exploratory aspect is 
a strong source of engagement. According to Sauvé et al (2007, p. 250): “during the game, the 
learner plays first, understands after, and then generalizes.” The authors find that assessment to 
be even more pertinent in electronic games, as players usually deduce the rules as they go. 
Finally, simulation-games have been found to be effective tools for learning about 
complex concepts or dynamic situations (Pasin & Giroux, 2011), and acquiring a global 
perspective toward systemic effects and unintended consequences (Machuca, 2000). This deep 
learning can be attributed to the opportunities players have to “learn from model responses to 
their decision-making” (Van der Zee & Slomp, 2009, p. 17), which is what the gaming layer 




a simulation-game “is essentially a case study, but with participants on the inside”, participants 
become part of the model themselves which puts them “in the hot seat for it is they job to take 
decisions.”  
For these positive outcomes to occur, I identified four required features of simulation-games:  
1) Trial and error structure: making useful mistakes – that convey a lesson – should be part 
of the process and can be prompted by design. Progress in the game should come 
through a mistake elimination process, which is elegantly summarized by the expression 
from Annetta (2010, p. 108): “Pleasurable frustration.”  
2) Interaction and immediate feedback: the point of adding a game layer on a simulation 
model is to make it reactive and interactive. Causality between a player's actions and 
model's reactions should be made obvious through immediate feedback for the teaching 
point to be clear.  
3) Challenging but safe environment to experiment: the player should be encouraged to try 
many strategies, free from any real-life consequences – including the risk of losing face 
– or self-censorship. A simulation cannot fully reproduce real life’s stakes or stress, but 
should be challenging enough to be engaging. 
4) Gameplay and learning point synergy: Conceptual design of the game should be made 
so that style serves content, gameplay serves teaching point, and both are designed to 
merge coherently. Mitgutsch and Alvarado (2012) explain how simply putting the 
entertainment part and the learning part side by side does not make an effective serious 
game. Arisha and Tobail (2013) offer a good example by choosing to make their 
simulation-game real-time to mimic the dynamism and time pressure of the environment 
they simulate.  
 
In the next chapters, I detail the simulation-game that I developed: The Lead-Time 










4.4) Lead-Time Manager: Scenario 
In the basic version, the player takes the role of the top operations manager of a skiwear shop 
in the mountains of Europe that sells two kinds of products. The Fashion ski jacket has a 
comfortable financial margin, but a volatile demand, and overstocked products cannot be 
stored. The Standard ski jacket has a considerably smaller financial margin, but also a more 
stable demand, and potential overstock can be stored, at a reasonable cost, to be sold the 
following year at full price: the residual value of the standard jacket is the acquisition cost less 
the holding cost. The rationale behind these storage rules is that Fashion jackets belong to a 
collection specific to the current sales period, will be out of fashion next season and will need 
to make room for the new collection, while Standard jackets are basic - plain black or white - 
items that do not follow fashion cycles.  
The main goal is to maximize the company’s profit. To reach this goal, the player 
controls sourcing and production decisions, for a predefined number of in-game years. The 
player can choose between ordering the jackets from a low-cost offshore supplier, or building 
local capacity to produce on-site and on-demand, at a cost premium.  
Each year is divided in three periods. The first period takes place a few months before 
the selling season. At this point, the player does not know what the demand for the year will be, 
but has to place an order for both types of jackets to the offshore supplier – because of 
production and delivery delay – and to build local capacity for the year if desired – hire 
employees and buy machines for the upcoming season. All the player knows is the mean and 
median demand for each type of product.  
The second period takes place during the selling season. The player discovers the 
demand for both products, receives the offshore order placed on the first period, and takes 
control of the amount of local capacity that was built. The goal is to use this local capacity to 
react to the discovered demand and try to match it with an appropriate supply. If local capacity 
is insufficient, potential sales are lost. If local capacity is too big, the player can produce 
Standard jackets to stock or let workers idle. If the offshore order is already greater than actual 
demand, there will be unsold jackets.  
The third period takes place after the selling season and is simply a time for the player 
to analyze the results of the year.  Each year goes through the same three-period cycle. 
To spice up the experience, real-life inspired events can be set to happen during the 
game. They include quality issues, offshore delivery problems, accounting errors, as well as 




These events truly capture the uncertainty of the supply-chain world, beyond demand risk 
modeling efforts. They will challenge the player’s ability to react to unexpected hurdles, the 
robustness and resilience of the production structure that follows the player’s sourcing strategy. 
Alternative goals, beyond profit, can be pursued as the interface displays sustainability 
indicators like the transportation carbon footprint and the number of scrapped jackets.  
 




4.5) Lead-Time Manager: Model  
As shown in the game flow in figure 4.1, the simulation model intervenes at two different points 
in the game: generation of the demand, which is the key feature, and computation of the results. 
The Lead-Time Manager follows the Quantitative-Finance-based model from de 
Treville et al. (2017). Demand for each product is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution, 
which captures the peaks inherent in volatile demand and avoids negative demand.  
Players are given mean and median demand for each of the two products. Because of 
the assumption that demand follows a lognormal distribution, the mean is greater than the 
median. The player is expected to use the ratio of the mean to the median to estimate demand 
volatility for the two products.  




 = 1.2 = 𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
2/2 . Therefore volatility = √2 ln(1.2) = 0.6. 
With that information and the use of the Newsvendor model to estimate the optimal 
order quantity given the price, cost and residual value of each product, the player can compute 
the expected fill rate, sales, leftover inventory and profit for each product, and can thus make 
an informed decision about how to balance offshore and local production.  
To comply with this mathematical structure of the problem, the role of the model at this 
point is to generate a demand value according to a lognormal distribution with the parameters 
set by the administrator. The scenario of the game asks for a rather important volatility for the 
Fashion jacket, and a more modest volatility for the Standard jacket. This core feature makes 
the repetition of play possible for the Lead-Time Manager. Even with the same parameters, 
every run of the simulation generates different values, testing the robustness of the player’s 
strategy.  
However, it also means that two runs are hardly comparable, as a player might be lucky 
over the 10 or 15 years of a run and have only high demand values that flatter even a wobbly 
strategy, while another player might get mostly low values that undermine a sound one. To keep 
it a fair competition, each run result is compared with its own possible optimal result given the 
demand values – which can be done using the data trace from the backend. Alternatively, it is 
possible to replace the stochastic demand generator with preset demand data for a special event 






The second task of the model is to compute results at the end of each year, which is a 
set of basic calculations that can be summarized as follows for each product:  
 
Available products  = offshore order + local production. 
Sales    = MIN(demand ; Available products). 
Leftovers   = MAX(0 ; Available products – demand).   
Offshore costs  = order cost * offshore order. 
Local costs   = fixed costs + (variable cost * local production). 
Storage costs   = storage cost * Leftovers.        [if storable] 
Earnings   = Sales * price.  
Total cost   = Offshore costs + Local costs + Storage costs. 
Profit   = Earnings – Total cost. 




















4.6) Lead-Time Manager: Interface 
Buchanan et al. (2011) note that different types of game interfaces fit different learning 
objectives, and that 3D worlds do not offer added value for knowledge acquisition. Instead, 
casual games’ basic controls speed up the interface learning curve and focus on content. 
The Lead-Time Manager interface does not represent any particular environment or 
display any skeuomorphic elements. Instead, it focuses on presenting only the figures necessary 
for player decision-making along the lines of a classic management game. 
The interface is built around five main blocks, four of them display information while 
the central block is used to gather player’s input for each period. Figure 4.2 shows the schematic 
representation and figure 4.3 shows the interface of the simulation-game. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Schematic representation of the Lead-Time Manager interface. 
 
 




Figure 4.4 shows the interface during the first period of each year. 
Demand is not yet known. The player is prompted for the offshore order decision for 
each product and can increase or decrease the local capacity that will be available later in the 
year. 
In the case shown here, the player decides to order 50 Fashion jacket and 100 Standard 
jackets offshore, and increases the local capacity to 75 units for a fixed cost of 2250€. 
 
 








Figure 4.5 shows the interface during the second period of each year. 
Demand is now known. The player is prompted to allocate local capacity to the 
production of the different products.  
In the case shown here, the player chose in period 1 to increase the local capacity to 75, 
and to make an offshore order for 50 Fashion jackets and 100 Standard jackets.  
Discovering that the demand this year is respectively for 110 and 230 units, the player 
chooses to allocate 60 units of local capacity to the production of Fashion jackets – which added 
to the 50 from offshore is enough to cover the demand – and is left with only 15 units to allocate 
to Standard jackets production, and is therefore not able to satisfy all the demand.  
 
 




Figure 4.6 shows the interface during the third period of each year. 
No input is required at this step. The goal is simply to give the player a chance to analyze 
the results of the year, including product sourcing, financial summary and environmental data, 
and to think twice about the adjustments to the strategy that can be made the next year. Clicking 
on the green button starts the period 1 of the next year. 
In the case shown here, the player managed to make a profit of 6425€, mainly driven by 
the fulfillment of all the demand for Fashion jackets. No units have been scrapped because no 
Fashion jacket was produced in excess. The carbon footprint is not negligible due to 2/3 of the 
production having been made offshore.  
 
 





4.7) Lead-Time Manager: Pedagogical Point and Course Integration 
At the Bachelor level, we want to familiarize students with demand volatility and production 
optimization under uncertain demand by minimizing mismatch costs. 
At the Master level, we want students to build a sustainable operations strategy by 
creating a portfolio of products with different volatility and leverage responsiveness. 
At both levels, we start by making a basic version of the game available to students 
before teaching the material in class. In the spirit of the Experiential Learning theory (Kolb, 
2014), we let students discover by themselves. 
After a week, students learn the relevant theory, and are encouraged to play the 
simulation-game in teams to come up with more sophisticated solutions. Surprising events are 
added to the game, which, we agree with Wouters et al. (2013, p. 261), yields “a higher level 
of deep knowledge.” 
After another week, students are asked to play a run in-class, and to fill in a report 
explaining their strategy. By comparing recorded data of the player's run and the report, we 
evaluate consistency, strategy soundness and level of understanding of the material.  
It is important to give students time to learn the ropes of the simulation-game; trial and 
error is, as mentioned, the heart of the learning experience with this kind of tool. 
A usual gap – and common student concern – in the university learning process is the 
lack of application, hands-on experience, which in the sense of the Experiential Learning 
theory, makes it incomplete. University knowledge sometimes feels like lyophilized food, 
waiting for the water of professional experience. Simulation-games provide students with some 
experience, some edible food, instead of just loading them with powder. 
The Lead-Time Manager has been positively reviewed by students, their feedback 











4.8) Lead-Time Manager: A Wide Spectrum of Applications  
We started using the Lead-Time Manager as a teaching tool. First, it was an experimental 
accessory, and as it improved through the iterations, we developed accompanying content and 
activities, and made it more central to the teaching plan. As the work of Professor de Treville 
drew attention in discussions about developed countries competitiveness and reshoring, we 
were invited to address leaders in politics and industry. 
The Lead-Time Manager proved its formidable efficiency as an intervention tool, 
making research outcomes understandable to non-academics and provoking debates on aspects 
that are crucial, but usually too technical for such gatherings. Our scenario in public settings is 
to briefly present the context and mechanics of the game, and ask participants to make decisions. 
Early decisions are usually wrong, but the ice is broken, the room starts engaging and 
participants understand not only the gameplay but the operation of the model, bypassing the 
wall of technicalities. 
We also used the game at an event organized for senior citizens, and developed a spin-
off simulation for a laboratory trial.   
The design and code of the Lead-Time Manager make it easy to customize. It is 
straightforward to change products’ profiles, price, costs and demand data, and to add events 
or alter their occurrence in the scenario. For example, in the spring of 2020, we added a custom 
event in which a pandemic blocked the cargo ships in the ports, resulting in the offshore order 
arriving too late to be sold during the season. The fit with current news helps players engage 
and see the relevance of the exercise. 
It is also possible to customize the game to adapt it to a different industry or to a 
company that would share its data with us. 
As a communication tool, it adds more impact if the simulation-game is adapted to the 
topic of the conference or gathering. As a teaching device, it demonstrates to students that the 









4.9) Good Practices From our Experience  
Looking back on five years of development and use of the Lead-Time Manager, here are a few 
lessons learned and good-practice advice for such endeavors. 
First, it is paramount to get the technical aspects right. Nothing ruins a class session like 
a bad bug or a piece of software that cannot run on some computers. Another tool that we use 
in the course, with a powerful teaching message, has stopped evolving and can only be run on 
old computers of the university lab. Although this software is powerful, the fact that it can no 
longer run on a student’s devices dramatically reduces their engagement with it. Avoiding these 
pitfalls with our tool translated into two objectives: compatibility and robustness. HTML 5 web-
apps have limits in terms of performance and features compared to native programs, but 
reliability, multi-platform compatibility and ease of use with any modern web browser have 
been such an asset in so many cases that it was the right option. The developer and the teaching 
team must have this discussion at an early stage of the project. 
The second point, to paraphrase Osterwalder et al. (2014), is not to fall in love with your 
first idea. Opt for an iterative development and accept necessary changes even when they do 
not fit your original idea. I started developing the Lead-Time Manager in 2015 as a personal 
project, to help myself understand course theory. I then became a course assistant and showed 
the tool to Professor de Treville who had an enthusiastic vision for developing it further, but 
did not hesitate to change many aspects – interface, scenario, gameplay – through an iterative 
process fueled by students’ feedback. In 2016, we obtained funding from University of 
Lausanne to hire a professional developer to improve the interface and create a backend 
allowing us to record participants runs, and we benefited from a partnership with Forio, a well-
known and reliable platform, so anyone can access our simulation-game for free on any device 
with a modern web browser. Five years later, we still regularly tweak the program. 
Third, in accordance with Van der Zee and Slomp (2009, p. 25), make sure to not only 
record the performances and results, but also a “decision trace” of the players choices, so that 
they can replay their run and identify turning points. Pasin and Giroux (2011) add that 
simulations must be transparent enough – as opposed to copyrighted black boxes – that students 
can understand the mechanics of the model step by step.  
Finally, it is fundamental to integrate gracefully and meaningfully the “serious” and 
gamified parts. Planting a décor and unrelated gameplay around a teaching point does not make 
an efficient teaching tool. Asking a Biology question at the end of a Mario Kart race does not 




4.10) Proposed Validation Protocol 
The Lead-Time Manager has received praise from students in teaching evaluations, as well as 
enthusiastic feedback from practitioners in conferences, but at this point it lack a formal 
validation process. In this chapter, I propose a plan of what such a validation process could 
consist of. As explained in chapter 1.4.3, A/B testing on students is against university rules, 
while questionnaires can inform on some aspects of participants' attitude but do not accurately 
capture all the dimensions that we want to evaluate. 
 
These dimensions are: 
• Full acquisition of the skills necessary to analyze and make a reasoned decision about 
an offshoring problem involving mismatch costs. 
• Attitude toward the acquired material: interest in the material, assessment of the level 
of importance of mismatch costs in an offshoring decision, confidence in the ability to 
apply the analysis in real-life conditions. 
• Ability to apply the acquired skills to real, possible ill-structured, problems. 
 
A proposed protocol would be to recruit workers on the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
platform, and divide them between into two groups, one undergoing a classical ex-cathedra 
training on the topic, the other undergoing a training based on Active Learning principles with 
the Lead-Time Manager playing a central role. Considering our target public with the Lead-
Time Managers is wide but based on a interest in supply-chain management, I recommend not 
basing the recruitment on demographic criteria, but restricting it to people studying or working 
in the fields on business, management, supply-chain, procurement, operations. A total sample 
size of 120 participants randomly assigned to one of the two groups would permit to teach to a 
class size comparable to a university Master level course and would provide a 20% buffer to 
end with at least 50 participants in each condition in case of dropouts. 
In order to follow the usual course integration described in chapter 4.7, the study would 
consist in 8 sessions of one hour each, that I propose to spread over four weeks to give time to 
participants to digest and think through the material. Sessions 1, 3, 5 and 8 are common to both 
groups and could be given simultaneously to eliminate the risk of involuntary difference in 







Figure 4.7: Organization of the sessions for the Lead-Time Manager validation protocol. 
 
The final evaluation would present data about a company facing an offshoring 
opportunity, as well as an interview from the manager explaining the cost savings expectations 
of the company. Part of the data would be ill-structured, and some figures would need to be 
estimated, but all the content necessary to a mismatch cost analysis would be retrievable. 
The first part of the exercise would consist in filling an Excel template and computing 
basic outputs such as a volatility analysis, an optimal order quantity using the Newsvendor 
model, a fill rate estimate. The second part of the exercise, a less guided task, would ask 
participants to make a recommendation - offshore or stay local - and justify it with a short essay. 
A questionnaire would finally be distributed asking participants about the confidence they have 
in the answers they just submitted, their overall ability and willingness to apply the learned 
material outside of the experiment. The percentage of dropouts in each condition could also be 












Serious games, or pedagogical simulation-games, mix a real-life-based model with the 
mechanics of games. The recipe for creating an effective simulation-game is not simple and 
cannot easily be standardized because it is essential that gameplay and educative aspects have 
an authentic synergy and coherence, and that the technical aspects be on point. When this sweet 
spot is found, a simulation-game can be a powerful teaching and communication tool.  
The aim of the Lead-Time Manager simulation-game is to transmit research insights 
about the value of lead-time and the competitivity of local manufacturing.  
Given the counterintuitive, non-linear and mathematically sophisticated nature of the 
content, we draw on pedagogical assets of simulation-games such as trial and errors process, 
immediate feedback and challenging gameplay to provoke a shift in players’ heuristics and 
approach of the problem. 
This simulation-game can be used in various settings, and the level of analysis around 
it can be adapted to these different settings. In conferences with practitioners and policymakers 
it can be used as medium to introduce in an intuitive way a complex problem and start a 
discussion at an unusual level of technicality. In a university Operations Management course, 
it can be integrated in a pedagogical active learning plan to increase students’ appropriation of 
the course theoretical content, and their ability to understand the applications of this content to 
real-life problems. 
Development and use of Lead-Time Manager over the past five years increased the 
impact of our Operations management courses and research insights. We are now developing 
formal methods to measure the effect of game playing on student self-efficacy beliefs and on 














Recent research has shown that local manufacturing in a high-cost environment can be viable 
and competitive. However, managers often fail to see it because such concepts as demand 
uncertainty, mismatch cost and volatility portfolio are counterintuitive and difficult to 
cognitively apprehend in a decision-making process. In this thesis, I studied offshoring 
decision-making through the lens of bounded rationality, and developed a simulation-game to 
help communicate research insights with an active learning approach.  
My premise is absolutely not to discourage the use of heuristics in Operations decision-
making. Rather, it is to push for more understanding of the role of heuristics in offshoring 
problems, and to propose tools for their improvement and calibration, which in turn allows for 
a switch in decision-makers' perspective, and for the development of responsive production 
strategies. The operations field, and supply-chain management in particular, happens in what is 
fundamentally an environment made of uncertainty. This makes heuristics the appropriate tools 
to find suitable solutions to intractable problems, using limited resources. Meanwhile, the 
historical focus in research and in practice has been on optimization, which requires an artificial 
reduction of uncertainty to manageable risks, and has led to an oversimplification of the models, 
that end up having limited relevance for real-life problems. In this context, managers are on 
their own in front of complex problems, such as offshoring decisions. They can end up relying 
on unsuitable heuristics – as a default solution for lack of a better fitting tool in their mental 
heuristic toolbox – or failing to calibrate properly these heuristics when they cannot access a 
relevant representation of information of the environment, that would allow for ecologically 
rational reasoning in the sense of Gigerenzer (2003). My idea of the path to an improvement in 
the field of offshoring decision-making relies on two pillars: the analysis of heuristics used in 
such tasks, and the development of tools to transmit applicable research insights. In this thesis, 
I proposed three papers that I hope can open a way to meaningful contributions. 
In the first paper, I studied an offshoring decision in a laboratory experimental context. 
My results suggest that participants, even those studying business and management, failed to 
identify the optimal solution to a problem involving costs and demand volatility. Their decision-
making seems to be prone to biases leading to either too much offshoring, or not enough. It is 
also notable that this deviation from the optimal decision was not the result of a wish to pursue 
other goals than profit maximization, such as social or ecological concerns, and that 




In the second paper, I modified the trial to include non-economic factors. Peer influence 
was successfully used as a trigger for more offshoring, apparently unbeknownst to the 
participants. Social framing of the decision did not produce measurable effects, and I suggest 
this aspect is difficult to reproduce in a laboratory setting.  
Both papers contribute to underlining the need for decision helping tools. I introduced 
this thesis by asking why decision-makers keep offshoring their production, the core of their 
industrial structure and know-how, despite the self-inflicted constraints it creates on their 
supply-chain and the noxious social and environmental externalities. My conviction is that in 
many cases, this decision is the result of a framing error of a complex offshoring problem. The 
oversimplified approach that reduces the scope of the problem to cost minimization has spread 
to the point of becoming the norm, but its myopic focus on unit costs does not serve well the 
higher-level objectives of companies, not even their profit in contexts where mismatch costs 
matter. In order to make better-informed choices, to make an efficient use of the right heuristics, 
to select more accurate decisions strategies, decision-makers should first be empowered to have 
a fuller grasp of the problem, its intertwined consequences, its context. An alternative approach 
of the offshoring problem exists, that offers a broader view of the stakes and consequences, and 
turns offshoring into a capacity allocation problem that reveals the value of responsiveness 
through the lead-time reduction allowed by a local production. The second part of my work is 
to convey these research insights. 
In the third paper, I described the development, and use cases of, the Lead-Time 
Manager, a simulation-game that addresses the complex notions related to lead-time involved 
in an offshoring decision. This tool can be used both as a teaching tool in a university course 
within the framework of Active Learning, and as a communication tool in events involving 
practitioners and policymakers. In both contexts, the simulation-game generates discussions at 
a level of technicality and involvement higher than with traditional approaches. 
I wish to pursue the development of tools that contribute to decisions improvement in 
situations where responsiveness and lead-time reduction matter. The next step is to conduct a 
formal evaluation of two aspects of the Lead-Time Manager: performance – becoming better at 
evaluating offshoring options, and attitude – gaining confidence to effectively apply knowledge 
in real-life situations. Defining a test protocol applicable to various simulation-games would be 
an important contribution to the field of Active Learning and serious games. In parallel, I wish 
to develop an online course around the Lead-Time Manager to reach a broader audience of 




6) Data  
Raw data of the Switch trial (Chapters 2 & 3) are attached. 
Below is a simplified presentation of the data, formatted as follows: 
• PID (integer): unique identifier of each participation in the simulation. 
• Age (integer): age of the participant, asked on the briefing screen. 
• Country (string): country of origin of the participant, asked on the briefing screen.  
• Occupation (string): category of occupation of the participant, asked on the briefing 
screen. Options: student (business or economics), student (not business or economics), 
professional (employee), professional (manager), academic, other. 
• Scenario (integer): which of the four scenarios was experienced by the participant. 
• %MaxProfit (integer): ratio of final profit to maximum profit possible given each 
participant data. As it is computed based on a local-only production, it is possible to 
go beyond 100% in case of a successful offshoring.  
• Time (integer): time in seconds spent on the simulation by the participant. 
• Time Brief (integer): time in seconds spent on the briefing screen by the participant. 
• When Offshore (integer): month at which the participant decided to offshore. 13 
means the participant never offshored as the task lasts for 12 simulated months. 
• Rational (string): answer to the feedback question, “Which production option do you 
think was the most profitable?” Options: always offshore, always local, local at first 
then offshore after month 7, it was balanced. 
• Factors (string): answer to the feedback question, “What were the factors guiding 
your decisions?” Options: economic, social, both. 
• Risk Profile (string): answer to the feedback question, “How would you describe your 
general risk profile in life?” Options: risk seeker, neutral, risk averse, I don't know. 
• Calc (string): answer to the feedback question, “Were your decisions based on 
analysis and calculations?” Options: yes, somewhat, no. 
• Conv (string): answer to the feedback question, “Are you convinced you made the 
right decisions?” Options: yes, no. 
 









1 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 67 1077 376 9 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Some Yes 
2 23 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 94 838 136 8 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Some Yes 
3 19 Portugal Stu (b&e) 1 79 1203 333 13 Always Local Both Averse Yes No 
4 20 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 110 985 148 8 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Yes Yes 
5 21 Other Stu (b&e) 3 69 550 209 8 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Some No 
6 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 95 776 462 4 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Some No 
7 23 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 69 849 287 13 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse No No 
8 23 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 74 898 112 3 Always Offshore Economic Averse Some No 
9 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 101 1064 228 12 Always Local Both Averse Yes Yes 
10 22 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 52 1435 478 7 Always Local Economic Seeker Some No 
11 24 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 62 1181 669 13 Always Local Both Neutral Some Yes 
12 21 France Stu (b&e) 2 100 1873 347 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Yes Yes 
13 20 France Stu (b&e) 2 109 1872 670 9 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Yes Yes 
14 23 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 48 861 11 5 Always Local Both Neutral Some No 
15 22 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 96 1446 117 13 Local first, Offshore after 7 Social Averse No Yes 
16 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 96 2356 1088 1 It was balanced Both IDK Some No 
17 20 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 70 2088 592 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Seeker Some No 
18 19 France Stu (b&e) 3 77 1589 449 8 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Yes Yes 
19 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 62 1460 535 10 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Neutral Some Yes 
20 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 71 1380 643 13 Always Local Economic Averse Yes Yes 
21 19 France Stu (b&e) 2 86 1264 299 9 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Yes No 
22 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 62 666 139 5 Always Local Economic Neutral Some No 
23 20 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 21 164 6 7 Always Local Social Seeker Some No 
24 19 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 96 1441 802 10 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Yes Yes 
25 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 97 925 222 13 Always Local Economic Seeker Some Yes 




27 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 75 1234 724 13 Always Local Economic Neutral Yes Yes 
28 20 France Stu (b&e) 3 60 1480 407 9 Always Local Economic Averse Yes Yes 
29 20 France Stu (b&e) 1 75 137 6 13 Always Local Economic Averse Yes No 
30 22 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 75 1114 680 3 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Neutral Yes Yes 
31 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 65 1157 417 8 Always Local Both Neutral Some No 
32 25 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 37 1015 246 2 Always Offshore Both Neutral Yes Yes 
33 20 France Stu (b&e) 1 96 1278 344 7 Always Local Economic Seeker Yes No 
34 20 France Stu (b&e) 2 95 913 335 13 Always Local Economic Averse Some Yes 
35 23 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 95 557 183 13 It was balanced Economic Averse No Yes 
36 21 France Stu (b&e) 2 43 960 360 10 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Averse Some No 
37 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 97 844 122 13 Always Offshore Both Neutral Some Yes 
38 20 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 26 1121 385 4 It was balanced Economic Seeker Some Yes 
39 24 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 58 845 318 9 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Seeker Some No 
40 19 Other Stu (b&e) 4 71 1121 354 13 It was balanced Both Averse Some Yes 
41 21 Other Stu (b&e) 4 102 899 218 11 Always Local Economic Averse Some No 
42 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 1 980 287 13 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Averse Yes No 
43 24 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 96 2382 416 11 It was balanced Both Neutral Yes Yes 
44 19 France Stu (b&e) 1 98 1729 247 13 Always Local Both Neutral Some Yes 
45 22 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 45 600 135 1 Always Offshore Economic Seeker Some No 
46 24 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 75 726 225 13 Always Local Both Neutral No No 
47 23 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 24 2057 440 8 It was balanced Economic Averse Some No 
48 34 Other Stu (b&e) 4 78 3038 209 13 Always Local Economic Averse Yes Yes 
49 20 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 94 1032 213 11 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both IDK Some No 
50 19 France Stu (b&e) 3 28 732 377 9 Always Local Economic Averse Yes No 
51 19 France Stu (b&e) 3 47 900 215 11 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Some Yes 
52 22 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 87 1561 584 5 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Averse Some No 
53 20 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 95 830 292 13 Always Local Economic Averse Yes Yes 
54 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 110 1319 253 6 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Neutral Yes Yes 
55 20 France Stu (b&e) 4 45 1162 651 13 Always Local Economic Neutral No No 
56 22 Other Stu (b&e) 4 79 909 293 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Seeker Yes No 
57 20 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 85 380 146 13 It was balanced Both Seeker Yes Yes 
58 19 France Stu (b&e) 3 10 820 485 1 It was balanced Both Averse No No 
59 20 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 45 533 292 4 Always Local Economic Neutral No No 
60 18 France Stu (b&e) 3 29 772 234 2 Always Offshore Economic Seeker Some Yes 
61 18 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 19 535 66 6 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Some No 
62 19 France Stu (b&e) 2 91 1100 590 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Some No 
63 19 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 63 1168 555 8 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Some Yes 
64 25 Russia Stu (b&e) 3 20 660 422 4 It was balanced Economic Neutral Some No 
65 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 96 700 188 10 It was balanced Both Neutral Yes Yes 
66 19 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 83 1096 529 8 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Neutral Some No 
67 19 France Stu (b&e) 1 85 1096 638 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Neutral Yes Yes 
68 22 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 5 772 181 11 It was balanced Both Seeker Yes No 
69 19 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 81 266 7 12 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Some No 
70 22 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 88 802 465 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Some Yes 
71 20 Other Stu (b&e) 4 114 889 260 8 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Some Yes 
72 20 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 99 653 177 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Some No 
73 20 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 75 744 200 12 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Seeker Some No 
74 19 France Stu (b&e) 3 5 954 474 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Seeker Some No 
75 20 France Stu (b&e) 2 85 750 149 13 Always Local Both Averse Some Yes 
76 32 Switzerland Pro (emp) 1 96 1342 370 13 It was balanced Both Averse Yes Yes 
77 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 59 1566 1081 13 Always Local Social Neutral Some Yes 
78 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 92 1764 455 13 It was balanced Social Seeker Yes Yes 
79 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 57 1169 581 3 Always Local Economic Seeker Some No 
80 18 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 65 84 7 1 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Yes Yes 
81 21 Other Stu (b&e) 3 45 1510 489 6 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse No No 
82 21 USA Stu (b&e) 3 74 1787 386 4 Always Offshore Economic Neutral Yes Yes 
83 19 France Stu (b&e) 2 94 1091 516 7 It was balanced Economic Averse Some No 
84 21 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 2 25 1517 421 9 It was balanced Economic Seeker Some No 
85 19 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 90 1253 280 13 Always Local Both Neutral Some Yes 
86 20 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 4 69 1128 237 4 It was balanced Economic Neutral Some No 
87 20 Other Stu (b&e) 4 24 1166 238 10 It was balanced Both Seeker Some No 
88 19 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 98 1079 349 13 Always Local Economic Averse Yes Yes 
89 21 Other Stu (b&e) 4 0 909 206 6 Always Local Economic Seeker Yes No 
90 22 France Stu (b&e) 1 62 749 252 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Averse Some Yes 
91 31 USA Pro (emp) 3 56 673 210 6 Always Offshore Both Averse Yes No 
92 58 USA Pro (mana) 4 47 1132 916 13 Always Offshore Both Averse Some Yes 
93 41 USA Pro (emp) 1 85 1086 399 9 Always Local Both Seeker Yes No 
94 38 USA Pro (emp) 1 54 578 379 10 It was balanced Both Averse Yes Yes 
95 49 USA Pro (emp) 2 0 612 428 2 Always Offshore Economic Averse Yes No 
96 32 USA Pro (emp) 2 82 772 421 13 Always Local Both Averse Yes Yes 
97 41 USA Pro (emp) 1 40 614 206 4 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Yes No 
98 37 USA Pro (emp) 4 95 844 207 13 It was balanced Both Averse Some Yes 
99 50 USA Pro (mana) 1 7 2202 176 10 Always Local Both Neutral Some No 
100 33 USA Pro (emp) 4 59 487 23 1 Always Offshore Economic Seeker Yes Yes 
101 36 USA Pro (mana) 1 49 397 229 3 Always Offshore Both Averse Yes No 
102 41 USA Pro (emp) 3 86 1471 192 7 Always Local Economic Seeker Yes No 
103 38 USA Pro (emp) 3 58 267 91 6 Always Offshore Economic Seeker Some No 
104 31 USA Pro (emp) 3 55 149 36 11 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Averse Yes Yes 
105 46 USA Pro (emp) 3 74 992 531 13 It was balanced Both Neutral Yes Yes 
106 23 Philippines Pro (emp) 2 61 1760 1114 6 It was balanced Both Seeker Some No 
107 55 USA Academic 4 97 1373 781 13 Always Local Economic Averse Yes Yes 
108 25 Switzerland Pro (emp) 3 91 2737 238 12 Always Local Economic Averse Yes Yes 
109 18 Other Stu (not) 3 48 433 195 13 Always Local Economic Seeker Some No 
110 19 Other Stu (not) 2 53 667 136 13 It was balanced Both Averse Some No 
111 23 Other Stu (not) 2 81 723 320 10 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Some No 
112 18 Other Stu (not) 2 41 584 213 3 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Yes Yes 
113 22 Switzerland Stu (not) 3 89 827 476 5 It was balanced Economic Neutral Some No 
114 22 Switzerland Stu (not) 3 41 169 12 1 Always Offshore Economic Neutral Some No 
115 19 Other Stu (not) 4 75 200 9 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Yes Yes 
116 24 Switzerland Stu (not) 2 97 944 462 13 Always Local Both Seeker Yes Yes 
117 21 France Stu (not) 4 78 981 277 10 Always Offshore Economic Seeker Some Yes 
118 19 Switzerland Stu (not) 1 92 891 223 13 It was balanced Both IDK Some Yes 




120 19 Other Stu (not) 2 112 1361 669 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both IDK Some Yes 
121 19 France Stu (not) 3 0 686 243 5 It was balanced Economic Seeker Some No 
122 23 Switzerland Stu (not) 2 96 954 512 13 Always Local Both Neutral Some Yes 
123 27 Other Stu (not) 2 105 915 569 11 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Some Yes 
124 19 France Stu (not) 4 42 866 532 13 Always Local Both Seeker Some Yes 
125 20 Other Stu (not) 3 60 815 148 13 Always Local Economic Neutral Yes No 
126 26 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 14 1032 766 4 Always Local Economic Seeker Some No 
127 20 Switzerland Stu (not) 4 10 1027 240 9 Always Local Economic Neutral Some No 
128 18 Switzerland Stu (not) 3 48 1105 660 5 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Some No 
129 22 Other Stu (not) 1 68 999 570 12 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Neutral Some No 
130 20 Germany Stu (not) 4 82 937 479 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Some No 
131 19 Switzerland Stu (not) 4 93 1102 438 13 Always Local Social Neutral Some No 
132 20 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 3 95 1235 590 12 Always Local Economic Neutral Yes Yes 
133 19 France Stu (not) 3 58 1286 275 5 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Some No 
134 24 Other Stu (b&e) 1 88 1515 516 12 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Neutral Yes Yes 
135 51 Switzerland Pro (mana) 1 55 2394 1001 13 Always Local Economic Averse Yes Yes 
136 21 Other Stu (not) 1 72 1793 814 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Some No 
137 22 Other Stu (b&e) 1 79 1118 354 5 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Some Yes 
138 18 Switzerland Stu (not) 2 81 1172 517 13 Always Local Economic Neutral Some No 
139 23 Switzerland Stu (not) 4 12 786 219 1 Always Offshore Economic Seeker Some No 
140 20 Switzerland Stu (not) 2 90 908 353 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Neutral Some No 
141 19 Switzerland Stu (b&e) 1 36 716 351 10 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Some No 
142 25 Switzerland Pro (emp) 4 104 2242 1079 9 Always Local Both Averse Yes No 
143 32 Other Academic 1 95 496 223 13 Always Local Economic Seeker Yes Yes 
144 56 Other Academic 2 91 1104 572 9 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Some No 
145 25 Other Academic 3 97 1870 299 13 Always Local Economic Averse Yes Yes 
146 25 Switzerland Academic 4 92 3489 527 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Yes No 
147 22 Russia Stu (b&e) 3 97 1628 366 13 Always Local Economic Neutral Yes Yes 
148 39 Switzerland Pro (emp) 2 97 1278 635 12 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Some No 
149 58 Switzerland Pro (emp) 4 88 1446 452 13 Always Local Both Seeker Some Yes 
150 28 Switzerland Pro (emp) 3 98 1388 623 13 Always Local Both Averse Some Yes 
151 24 Philippines Pro (emp) 1 4 1431 709 3 Always Local Both Seeker Some No 
152 25 Philippines Pro (mana) 2 108 2055 860 11 Always Local Economic Averse Some Yes 
153 24 Philippines Pro (emp) 3 9 2054 827 3 It was balanced Economic Seeker Yes No 
154 24 Philippines Pro (emp) 1 23 2006 338 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Social Seeker Yes Yes 
155 23 Philippines Pro (emp) 2 99 2043 547 6 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Neutral Yes Yes 
156 19 Philippines Stu (b&e) 1 39 1320 515 1 It was balanced Economic Neutral Yes Yes 
157 53 Philippines Pro (emp) 3 0 1753 438 2 It was balanced Economic Neutral Yes Yes 
158 23 Philippines Pro (emp) 1 52 957 669 13 Always Local Both Averse Yes Yes 
159 22 Philippines Pro (emp) 1 22 3040 973 8 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Yes Yes 
160 25 Philippines Pro (mana) 3 81 2450 1195 6 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Some Yes 
161 26 Philippines Pro (emp) 2 28 2231 656 6 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Some Yes 
162 25 Philippines Pro (emp) 4 18 2655 675 3 Always Local Both Seeker Yes No 
163 22 Philippines Pro (emp) 4 47 1529 39 13 Always Local Both Neutral Yes Yes 
164 22 Philippines Pro (emp) 2 87 2207 489 11 Always Local Both Seeker Yes Yes 
165 23 Philippines Stu (b&e) 4 98 2349 629 10 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Yes Yes 
166 26 Philippines Pro (emp) 2 0 1175 375 13 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Seeker No No 
167 24 Philippines Pro (emp) 1 80 1331 16 13 Always Local Both Neutral Yes Yes 
168 24 Philippines Pro (emp) 2 89 339 19 13 Always Local Economic Averse Yes Yes 
169 24 Philippines Pro (emp) 2 26 1123 421 3 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Yes Yes 
170 26 Philippines Pro (emp) 1 26 949 725 13 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Some Yes 
171 21 Philippines Pro (emp) 2 91 1340 832 12 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Yes Yes 
172 33 Philippines Pro (emp) 1 31 1966 1059 12 It was balanced Both Seeker Some No 
173 21 Philippines Pro (emp) 3 48 959 193 12 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Some No 
174 22 Philippines Pro (emp) 4 73 2371 1101 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Averse Yes Yes 
175 23 Philippines Pro (emp) 4 25 2934 1448 12 Always Local Economic Neutral Yes No 
176 27 Philippines Pro (emp) 2 86 450 35 13 Always Local Both Neutral Yes Yes 
177 19 Philippines Stu (b&e) 1 3 1740 541 2 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Yes No 
178 19 Philippines Stu (b&e) 2 6 1741 831 2 Local first, Offshore after 7 Social Seeker Some Yes 
179 24 Philippines Pro (emp) 3 59 3472 698 6 It was balanced Social Seeker Some No 
180 19 Philippines Stu (b&e) 4 72 1112 1002 6 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Seeker Yes Yes 
181 20 Philippines Stu (b&e) 3 37 1920 1506 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Averse Yes Yes 
182 20 Philippines Stu (b&e) 4 73 1173 649 8 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Seeker No No 
183 22 Philippines Stu (b&e) 1 46 1758 1049 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Yes Yes 
184 24 Philippines Pro (emp) 3 0 1103 263 10 It was balanced Economic Seeker Some No 
185 19 Philippines Stu (b&e) 4 69 588 59 8 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Seeker Some Yes 
186 19 Philippines Stu (b&e) 2 0 1248 81 2 Always Local Both Seeker Some No 
187 19 Philippines Stu (b&e) 1 21 2154 929 5 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Yes Yes 
188 21 Philippines Stu (not) 1 51 1542 729 11 It was balanced Both Seeker Some No 
189 19 Philippines Stu (b&e) 3 86 2375 1291 10 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Yes Yes 
190 19 Philippines Stu (b&e) 4 49 2585 1312 10 Always Local Economic Averse Some No 
191 22 Philippines Stu (b&e) 3 4 1683 793 9 Always Local Economic Seeker Some Yes 
192 19 Philippines Stu (not) 3 39 1738 656 4 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Yes No 
193 21 Philippines Stu (b&e) 1 88 1999 363 10 Always Offshore Both Neutral Yes No 
194 23 Philippines Stu (b&e) 2 66 2293 992 6 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Neutral Some Yes 
195 21 Philippines Stu (b&e) 1 99 2280 457 11 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Averse Yes Yes 
196 19 Philippines Stu (b&e) 2 28 2586 1433 12 Always Local Economic Seeker Yes No 
197 21 Philippines Stu (b&e) 2 90 2510 724 13 Always Local Economic Averse Yes Yes 
198 20 Philippines Stu (b&e) 4 73 2221 774 7 Local first, Offshore after 7 Both Neutral Yes Yes 
199 21 Philippines Pro (emp) 1 1 2355 723 3 Local first, Offshore after 7 Economic Seeker Some No 
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